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fessor Coates is on leave this fall in connection with his Institute of
Government. Mr. J. H. Chadbourn has completed his study of
Lynching and the Law and is now devoting his full time to the
School as an assistant professor in charge of the courses in Legal
Ethics, Civil Procedure One, Evidence and Federal Procedure, and
as faculty editor of the NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW. He is the
first graduate of the School to hold the latter position.
Visiting professors in the summer session of 1932 included James
M. Landis of Harvard, Henry Rottschaefer of Minnesota, Bryant
Smith of Texas and Dean Julian S. Waterman of Arkansas. The
attendance the first term was normal but there was a decrease in the
registration for the second term. All of the students certified by the
School successfully passed the State Bar examination held in August.
Professor Breckenridge spent the summer in Washington, en-
gaged in research for the Interstate Commerce Committee of the
House of Representatives. Dean Van Hecke taught the subject of
Contracts in the summer session of the Law School of Northwestern
University.
During the last school year the Law School prepared nine re-
search reports at the request and for the use of the Constitutional
Revision Commission.
NOTES AND COMMENTS
Corporations-Agreement to Repurchase Own Stock.
A Virginia corporation, through its chief executive officer, sold
shares of its stock to plaintiff with a written agreement to repur-
chase the stock at the same price at any time the owner desired to sell.
In an action for breach of the contract to repurchase, it was held
that, since the corporation had power to purchase its own stock, it
was liable to the extent of the full purchase price.'
Authorities are divided as to the inherent power of a corporation
to purchase its own shares. The English and minority American
view is that, in the absence of statutory authority, a corporation has
no power to purchase its own shares. 2 The theory is that such pur-
Grace Securities Corporation v. Roberts, 164 S. E. 700 (Va. 1932).
Trevor v. Whitworth, 12 App. Gas. 409 (1887) ; Int re London, H. & C. Exch.
Bank, 5 Ch. App. 444 (1870) ; Cartwright v. Dickenson, 88 Tenn. 479, 12 S. W.
1030 (1890); Hall & Farley v. Ala. Terminal & Improvement Co., 143 Ala.
464, 39 So. 285 (1905) ; Wilson v. Torchon Lace & Mercantile Co., 167 Mo.
App. 305, 149 S. W. 1156 (1912); Bear Creek Lumber Co. v. Second Nat.
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chase is ultra vires, because it is an unauthorized trafficking in the
shares, or an illegal reduction of the capital stock. 3 A substantial
American majority, including North Carolina,4 holds that such a
power, in the absence of statutory or charter restrictions, is not
ultra vires, and that it may be exercised where there is no fraud
or prejudice to the rights of creditors.5 These courts generally hold
that the purchase must be made from surplus funds and not from
capital stock funds.6 Some states have statutes prohibiting the pur-
chase by a corporation of its own stock.7 Other states expressly
Bank of Cumberland, 120 Md. 566, 87 Atl. 1084 (1913); 2 FLETCHER, Cyc.
CoRP. (1917) §§1134-5. Several exceptions are recognized. Thus, a corpora-
tion may take its own stock as security for an antecedent debt. Draper v.
Blackwell, 138 Ala. 182, 35 So. 110 (1903). Or in compromise of a disputed
claim or a hopeless debt. State v. Oberlin Bldg. Ass'n., 35 Ohio St. 258
(1879). Or in case of the involvency of its debtor. Morgan v. Lewis, 46
Ohio St. 1, 17 N. E. 558 (1888). Or by way of gift or devise. 3 Gratt. (Va.)
19, 46 Am. Dec. 183 (1846).
1 The leading case of Trevor v. Whitworth, supra note 2, lays down these
reasons which have been generally followed. If the corporation plans to re-
issue the shares, it is an unauthorized trafficking in its shares; if it does not
plan to reissue them, it is an illegal reduction of its capital stock.
'Blalock v. Kernersville Mfg. Co., 110 N. C. 99, 14 S. E. 501 (1891);
Thompson v. Shepherd, 203 N. C. 310, 165 S. E. 796 (1932) ; see Heggie v.
Peoples' Bldg. & Loan Ass'n., 107 N. C. 582, 596, 12 S. E. 275, 279 (1890).
1Johnson County v. Thayer, 94 U. S. 631, 24 L. ed. 133 (1876) ; Republic
Life Ins. Co. v. Swigert, 135 Ill. 150, 25 N. E. 680, 12 L. R. A. 328 (1890) ;
New England Trust Co. v. Abbott, 162 Mass. 148, 38 N. E. 432, 27 L. R. A.
271 (1894) ; Dock v. Schlicter Jute Co., 167 Pa. 370, 31 Atl. 656 (1895) ; U. S.
Mineral Co. v. Camden & Driscoll, 106 Va, 663, 56 S. E. 561 (1907) ; Tierney
v. Butler, 144 Iowa 553, 123 N. W. 213 (1909); Gilchrist v. Highfield, 140
Wis. 476, 123 N. W. 102 (1909); Dalton Grocery Co. v. Blanton, 8 Ga. App.
809, 70 S. E. 183 (1911) ; In re International Radiator Co., 10 Del. Ch. 358,
92 Atl. 255 (1914) ; 5 THomPSON, COPORATIONs (3d ed. 1927) §4081.
'The theory that the capital stock of a corporation becomes a trust fund
for the benefit of creditors upon the insolvency of the corporation has been
generally recognized. 91 U. S. 45, 23 L. ed. 203 (1875) ; Sanger v. Upton, 91
U. S. 56, 23 L. ed. 220 (1875); Hamor v. Taylor-Rice Eng. Co., 84 Fed. 392
(C. C. Del. 1897). Thus, under either rule, the purchase is invalid where the
capital stock is impaired, or where the corporation is insolvent, or the effect
of the purchase is to render the corporation insolvent. In re Tichenor Grand
Co., 203 Fed. 720 (S. D. N. Y. 1913); Coleman v. Tepel, 230 Fed. 63 (C. C.
A. 4th, 1916) ; Crandal v. Lincoln, 52 Conn. 73, 52 Am. Rep. 560 (1884) ; In
re Columbian Bank, 147 Pa. 422, 23 Atl. 625 (1892); Olmstead v. Vance &
Jones Co., 196 II1. 236, 63 N. E. 634 (1902). Generally, a purchase will be
sustained where the corporation has sufficient surplus at the time of the pur-
chase. Contra: In re Fechheimer-Fischel Co., 212 Fed. 357 (C. C. A. 2d,
1914), which holds that although there is a surplus at the time of the purchase,
if when the purchase price becomes due there is not sufficient surplus, the
purchase will not be sustained. This holding has received little support, and
has been adversely criticized. Note (1914) 14 COL. L. Rav. 451; Note (1914)
27 H.Rv. L. Rrv. 747.
7 WYo. Comp. STAT. ANN. (1920) §5056; Ky. STAT. (Carroll, 1930) §544.
Other states have statutes which, though they contain no express prohibition,
have been construed as having such. Steele v. Farmers' & Merchants' Mutual
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authorize such purchase under certain restrictions.8 Sound argu-
ments can be made to sustain both views.9 Commentators, as well
as the courts, are in direct conflict.' 0 The modern trend seems to
be toward the majority American view, and there is some evidence
that modem business approves of the practice. 1
The courts are likewise divided upon the validity of an agree-
ment by a corporation to repurchase stock from a stockholder who
has bought with such an understanding.12 Courts following the
Tel. Ass'n., 95 Kan. 580, 148 Pac. 661 (1915); Williams v. Md. Glass Corp.,
134 Md. 320, 106 Atl. 755 (1919) ; Simonds v. Noland, 142 Wash. 423, 253 Pac.
638 (1927). By U. S. REv. STAT. §5201, 12 U. S. C. A. §83 (1927) national
banks are expressly prohibited from purchasing their own stock.
6 "If the capital is not impaired thereby," DEL. REv. CODE (1915) §1923;
CoLo. ANN. STAT. (Mills, 1927) §996. "Out of surplus," FLA. Comp. LAWS(1927) §6534; LA. LAws (1928) Act 250, §23. "Out of surplus profits," N. D.
COMp. LAWS ANN. (1913) §4531. The Ohio corporation act as amended in
1929 contains elaborate provisions on the subject. OHIo GEN. CODE (Throck-
morton, 1929) §§8623-8641. The New York penal law makes it a misde-
meanor for directors to apply any but surplus funds to the purchase. N. Y.
PENAL LAW (1930) §664(5).
'Arguments for giving corporations such power: (1) gives the corporation
greater flexibility; (2) enables corporations to remove undesirable stockhold-
ers; (3) allows for employee stock-holding schemes. See as an excellent
article sustaining such power, Wormser, The Power of a Corporation t&Acqtire Its Own Stock (1915) 24 YALE L. REv. 177. Arguments against giv-
ing corporation such power: (1) enables corporation to speculate in its own
stock; (2) -permits preferences to favored stockholders; (3) provides illegal
method for reducing capital stock; (4) gives opportunity for abuse in cor-
porate management. See Levy, Purchase By a Corporation of Its Own Stock(1930) 15 MINN. L. REv. 1.
"'Pro: 2 CooK, CORPOATIONS (8th ed. 1923) §§311-13; 2 FLETCHER, CYc.
CORP. (1917) §1136. Con: 1 MACHEN, MODERN LAW OF CORPORATIONS (1908)§§626-30; GREEN'S BRICF, ULTRA VIREs (2d ed. 1880) §95. Thompson ant
Ballantine seem impartial. See 5 THOMPSON, op. cit. supra note 5, §§4081-99,.
BALLANTINE, CORPORATIONS (1927) §66.
"An examination of recent corporate balance sheets shows that a large
number of corporations carry treagury stock either at cost or at market. See
report of an address before the New York State Bankers' Association by Mr.J. Stewart Baker, president" of the association, in The Washington Star ofJune 14, 1932, urging corporations to utilize surplus cash for the purchase of
their securities at this time to check further declines. But see an article in
The Chicago Tribune of Feb. 22, 1932, commenting on Wall Street brokers'
statements -that such practice leads to many abuses. See full page advertise-
ment in U. S. Daily, Nov. 14, 1932, at 1657, and an article in Baltimore Sun,.
Nov. 16, 1932, indicating possible abuses.
'Agreements to repurchase stock sold by a corporation must be distin-
,uished from subscriptions to stock made with a secret agreement whereby the
subscriber is given the privilege of returning the stock and recovering the
money paid thereon. The former pertains to property belonging entirely to,
the corporation and may be dealt with as the company sees fit, just as any other
chattel which it might own. The latter type of agreement is definitely tied up-
with the rights of subscribers as a whole, and any such secret agreement is a.
fraud on them, and is uniformly held to be unenforceable. Burke v. Smith,
16 Wall. 390, 21 L. ed. 361 (1872) ; Scovill v. Thayer, 105 U. S. 143, 26 L. ed.
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American view uniformly hold that such a repurchase agreement is
valid and enforceable where the purchase does not impair the capital
stock.' 3 On the other hand, possibly a majority of the courts which
follow the English view that a corporation has no power to purchase
its own stock, nevertheless uphold the validity of repurchase agree-
ments.14  Such a holding is explained by a variety of reasons.
Some courts hold that a sale with a repurchase agreement is con-
ditional. 15  Since the purchaser does not get an absolute title,
there is no sale, and hence, no illegal purchase by the corporation.
Other courts hold that the contract of sale and repurchase is one
.entire contract; therefore, the corporation cannot repudiate the re-
purchase agreement and ratify the sale, but is liable for the pur-
chase price as for money had and received. 16 Other jurisdictions,
even where there are statutes prohibiting corporations from purchas-
ing their own stocks, construe the prohibition as not applying to
treasury stock as distinguished from stock of the original issue.17
968 (1881); Males Carved Moulding Co. v. Stulb, 215 Pa. 91, 64 Atl. 431(1906); Sarbach v. Kansas Fiscal Agency Co., 86 Kan. 734, 122 Pac. 113(1912) ; Boushall v. Stronach,. 172 N. C. 273, 90 S. E. 198 (1916) ; 2 F.ETCHER,
,CYc. CoRP. (1917) §§606, 607.
.Vent v. Duluth Coffee & Spice Co., 64 Minn. 307, 67 N. W. 70 (1896);
Fremont Carriage Co. v. Thomsen, 65 Neb. 370, 91 N. W. 376 ,(1902) ; Wis-
consin Lumber Co. v. Greene & Western Tel. Co., 127 Iowa 350, 101 N. W.
.742, 69 L. R. A. 968 (1904) ; Watson v. Virginia-Carolina Lumber Co., 93
.S. C. 1, 75 S. E. 1020 (1912); Paulsen v. Weeks, 80 Ore. 468, 157 Pac. 590
(1916) ; 5 THomPsox, op. cit. supra note 5, §4086. Of course, in order to hold
.a corporation on an agreement to repurchase, it must be established that the
.gent was authorized to make such an agreement, or that the corporation rati-
fied the act. Ordinarily, the managing officers of a corporation may bind it on
.a contract of repurchase. Phillips v. Riser, 8 Ga.. App. 634, 70 S. E. 79
(1911); Trenholm v. Kloepper, 88 Neb. 236, 129 N. W. 436 (1911); Murray
v. Standard Pecan Co., 309 Ill. 226, 140 N. E. 834 (1923) ; 5 THomPsoN, loc.
.cit. supra. If the length of the option is specified in the agreement, it must
lje exercised within a reasonable time after the expiration of the agreed period.
New Haven Trust Co. v. Gaffney, 73 Conn. 480, 47 AtI. 760 (1901). If no
time is fixed (as in the principal case) the -purchaser must exercise his right
"within a reasonable time. Roush v. Ill. Oil Co., 180 Ill. App. 346 (1913).
" Ophir Consol. Mines Co. v. Brynteson, 143 Fed.o 829 (C. C. A. 7th,
1906); Schulte v. Blvd. Gardens Land Co., 164 Cal. 464, 129 Pac. 582, 44
L. R. A. (N. S.) 156 (1913); Mulford v. Torrey Exploration Co., 45 Colo.
,1, 100 Pac. 596 (1909) ; Latulippe v. New England Inv. Co., 77 N. H. 31, 86AtI. 361 (1913); Simonds v. Noland, Williams v. Md. Glass Corp., both
supra note 7.
1 Ophir Consol. Mines Co. v. Brynteson, Mulford v. Torrey Co., both
.supra note 14; Williams v. Md. Glass Corp., supra note 7; Lyons v. Snider,
136 Minn. 252, 161 N. W. 532 (1917).
Porter v. Plymouth Gold Min. Co., 29 Mont. 347, 74 Pac. 938 (1904);
Latulippe v. New England Inv. Co., supra note 14; Griffin v. Bankers' Realty
Inv. Co., 105 Neb. 419, 181 N. W. 169 (1920).
2T Kom v. Cody Detective Agency, 76 Wash. 540, 136 Pac. 1155, 50 L. R. A.
(N. S.) 1073 (1913); Wilson v. Torchon Lace & Mercantile Co., .supra note
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Only a very few jurisdictions hold that such repurchase agreements
are unenforceable. 18 No case has been found in North Carolina in-
volving a repurchase agreement, but since this jurisdiction permits a
corporation to purchase its stock,19 there seems little doubt that the
Supreme Court will hold such an agreement valid.
This apparent effort of the courts to give effect to repurchase
agreements can perhaps be explained by the general desirability and
usefulness of such agreements. They form a necessary adjunct to
most employee stock-holding schemes, enabling employees to share
in the profits of the business.20 Further, this type of agreement
aids in inducing otherwise reluctant investors to purchase corporate
stock.2 ' Undoubtedly, however, opportunity is given for the crea-
tion of a favored class of stockholders to the possible detriment of
non-assenting stockholders.2 2 Such a possibility is well illustrated
in the principal case, where the favored stockholder is allowed to
dispose of his stock to the corporation at a price five times greater
than the market value. If the stockholders consider such discrim-
ination unfair, they should be allowed to prevent it by a specific
corporate by-law or charter restriction; for a general legislative pro-
hibition, in attempting to stamp out possible abuses, would make
unavailable the beneficial effects of repurchase agreements.
ROBERT A. Hovis.
Husband and Wife-Presumptions-Transfer of Property
From Wife to Husband.
Husband and wife owned land; the profits therefrom and the
proceeds of a sale of it were invested by the husband in his business.
After judgment against him by a creditor, the husband executed a.
2; Mulford v. Torrey Exploration Co., supra note 14. See Note (1927) 36
Micir. L. Rr'v. 790 at 794 to the effect that such a distinction is not generally
recognized.
I Civil Service Inv. Ass'n. v. Thomas, 138 Tenn. 77, 195 S. W. 775 (1917);
Morril v. Mastin, 23 N. M. 563, 170 Pac. 45 (1918); Pothier v. Reid Air
Spring Co., 103 Conn. 380, 130 Atl. 383 (1925). But cf. Topken, Loring &
Schwartz, Inc. v. Schwartz, 249 N. Y. 206, 163 N. E. 735 (1928).
" Cases cited supra note 4.
" Levy, supra note 9, at 2 and 32 ; Fordham, Some Legal Aspects of Em-
ployee Stock Purchase Plans (1930) 8 N. C. L. REv. 161.
1 It is obvious, of course, that a purchase with such an agreement presents
an attractive investment, for it gives the purchaser an opportunity to escape
what might be a bad investment. Vent v. Duluth Coffee & Spice Co., supra
note 13; Schulte v. Blvd. Gardens Land Co., supra note 14.
1 Levy, supra note 9, at 7 and 34. The author severely criticizes such stock-
selling schemes, pointing out the abuses which are often attendant upon such
practices.
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deed of trust to secure the alleged debt due the wife. In a creditor's
suit to set aside the trust deed, held, the decree of the lower court
adjudging the trust deed valid and dismissing the bill was error, for
a presumption of a gift to the husband arises and the burden is upon
the wife to show a loan and a contemporaneous promise on his part
to pay the debt.'
At common law, the attempted contracts of a married woman
were absolutely void, with few exceptions. 2 Likewise, gifts8 be-
tween husband and wife were generally void.4 But modern statutes 5
have greatly modified common law rules, so that now spouses may
make gifts to each other as though the marriage relation were non-
existent,6 if not made to defraud creditors.7 Such transactions are,
1 Brunswick Bank & Trust Co. v. Valentine, 164 S. E. 569 (Va. 1932).
TIFFANY, Do.STIC RELATIONS (3d ed. 1921) 156; BINGHAm, THE LAW
OF INFANCY AND COVERruRE (1849) 181: "Married women are by the law of
England, subject, in matters of contract, to a greater disability even than in-
fants; (a) for the contracts of an infant are, as hath been shewn, for the
most part only voidable, while those of married women are, with few excep-
tions, absolutely void."
*To constitute a valid gift there must be an intention of the donor to give,
acceptance by the donee and delivery of the article given. Helmer v. Helmer,
159 Ga. 376, 125 S. E. 849 (1924), 37 A. L. R. 1137 (1925) ; Atchley v. Rim-
mer, 148 Tenn. 303, 255 S. W. 366 (1923), 30 A. L. R. 1481 (1924). Gen-
erally, transfer of money or other property by a debtor to one to whom he is
indebted is presumed a satisfaction of the debt, not a gratuity; but an excep-
tion seems to have been made in case of a transfer by husband to wife. 71
A. L. R. 1024 (1931).
' LONG, DomESTic RmATIONs (3d ed. 1923) 245: "Thus, a gift of money by
a husband to his wife is void at law, and as inoperative as a gift to himself";
1 BRIGHT, LAW OF HUSBAND AND WIFE AS RESPECTS PaoPErTY (1850) 29:
"Upon the principle of union of husband and wife so as to be but one person,
the husband could not by any common law conveyance give or grant any estate
to the wife, either in possession, reversion, or remainder: and the same dis-
ability prevailed in regard to the wife."
I N. C. CODE ANN. (Michie, 1931) §§2506-2530 (married women's act of
North Carolina); Murphy v. Wolfe, 45 S. W. (2d) 1079 (Mo. 1932) ; Taft v.
Covington, 199 N. C. 51, 153 S. E. 597 (1930); LONG, op. cit. supra note 4, at
243; 1 ScnouLER, DomEsTic RELATIONs (6th ed. 1921) 307: "Elevated to the
pedestal of honor, and made the object of reverent esteem, if not idolatry, the
wife stands perhaps as securely as she ever can upon the prosaic ground of
legal equality"; TIFFANY, op. cit. supra note 2 at 159.
' Murphy v. Wolfe, supra note 5; Hillwood v. Hillwood, 159 Md. 167, 150
Atl. 286 (1930) ; Birkhauser v. Ross, 102 Cal. App. 582, 283 Pac. 866 (1929) ;
Hendrix v. Bank of Portal, 169 Ga. 264, 149 S. E. 879 (1929); Barbee v.
Harvey, 214 Ky. 461, 283 S. W. 442 (1926) ("The only difference between a
gift by a wife to a stranger and one made to her husband consist (sic) not in
her right to make one to her husband, but in the probative force of the ev-
idence establishing such gift") ; Moore v. Moore, 237 Ill. App. 190 (1925). In
New Jersey a wife may not contract with her husband, but may make a gift
to him. Young v. Gnichtel, 28 F. (2d) 789 (D. C. N. J. 1928).
' Birkhauser v. Ross; Moore v. Moore, both supra note 6.
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however, viewed with suspicion." As between husband and wife, a
transfer by the wife to her husband of personalty9 or realty,10 will
not usually be presumed to be a gift;" whereas in the case of a
transfer by the husband to his wife, there is a presumption of a
gift.12
8 Hillwood v. Hillwood, supra note 6: "The law on this subject is familiar.
It is that a wife may dispose of her property by gift to her husband as fully
and effectually as if the transaction were between persons not occupying that
relation, but, because of the natural dominance of the husband and the trust
and confidence commonly incident to their union, the gift will be closely, care-
fully and vigorously investigated in a court of equity, and be annulled if ob-
tained by fraud, coercion, misrepresentation or undue influence"; Hill v. Hill,
217 Ala. 235, 115 So. 258 (1928).
'Parker v. Staley, 21 S. W. (2d) 200 (Mo. App. 1929) (gift of note);
Holohan v. McCarthy, 130 Ore. 577, 281 Pac. 178 (1929) (gift of furniture);
Jent's Ex'rs v. Dodson, 220 Ky. 181, 294 S. W. 1052 (1927). Indorsement and
delivery of stock by wife to husband, together with husband's testimony that
it was a gift, is sufficient to authorize inference of gift. Mack v. Pardee, 39
Ga. App. 310, 147 S. E. 147 (1929). Advancement of money by wife to hus-
band to permit him to purchase stock in his name is not presumed a gift. Gil-
bert v. Gilbert, 180 Ark. 596, 22 S. W. (2d) 32 (1929). Finding that prior
to death wife transferred stock to her husband by signature shows a valid gift.
Greer v. Stilwell, 184 Ark. 1102, 44 S. W. (2d) 1082 (1932).
"Hendrix v. Bank of Portal, supra note 6.
" Hendrix v. Bank of Portal, supra note 6, "The evidence to support it must
be clear and unequivocal and the intention of the parties must be free from
doubt"; Jent's Ex'rs v. Dodson; Gilbert v. Gilbert, both supra note 9.
"Where husband purchases property and takes title in his wife's name,
there is a presumption of gift, not of trust. Nordquist v. Malmberg, 213 Cal.
394, 2 Pac. (2d) 334 (1931) (presumption not overcome by mere fact husband
paid taxes and repairs alone); Hines v. Baker, 299 Pac. 5 (Colo. 1931);
Swendick v. Swendick, 221 Ala, 337, 128 So. 593 (1930) ("The presumption
that an advancement or gift was intended is not however a presumption of law,
but one of fact, and may be overcome by proof of the real intent of the parties
as reflected in the conditions and circumstances attending the transaction");
Holohan v. McCarthy, supra note 9; Wies v. O'Horow, 337 Ill. 267, 169 N. E.
168 (1929); Rosecrans v. Rosecrans, 99 N. J. Eq. 176, 132 Atl. 100 (1926).
Presumption of gift of money by husband to wife, which she deposited in her
name, may be overcome by parol. Monohan v. Monohan, 77 Vt. 133, 59 Atl.
169 (1904), 70 L. R. A. 935 (1905). Presumption may be overcome where
facts show contrary intent. Fulbright v. Phoenix Ins. Co., 30 S. W. (2d)
870 (Mo. App. 1930). By statute in Georgia payment of purchase money by
husband or wife with title in the other is presumed a gift. GA. CODE ANN.
(Michie, 1926) §3740. But parol evidence is admissible to rebut the presump-
tion. Romano v. Finley, 172 Ga. 366, 157 S. E. 669 (1931). Evidence that
stock was transferred by husband to wife in order to secure a loan precludes
presumption of gift, requiring wife to prove gift by convincing evidence.
Platt v. Huegel, 326 Mo. 776, 32 S. W. (2d) 605 (1930). Where husband has
deed made to himself and wife, spouses become tenants by entirety, and pre-
sumption is that husband took the deed as he did as gift to wife. Alexander
v. Alexander, 44 S. W. (2d) 872 (Mo. App. 1932). Extent that the share of
purchase money contributed by the husband exceeded the part contributed by
the wife for land jointly, is presumed a gift. Coffman v. Coffman, 108 W. Va.
285, 150 S. E. 744 (1929). As to effect upon character of estate in entirety of
the fact that one spouse already had an estate in the land, see Sprinkle v. Spain-
hour, 149 N. C. 223, 62 S. E. 910, 25 L. R. A. (N. S.) 167 (1908) ; Garris v.
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A wife may make a valid loan tq her husband' 3 and, where there
is an express promise by him to repay, the transaction is dearly a
loan.14 There is some conflict of authority, however, where the hus-
band receives and uses his wife's money or other property without
an express promise of repayment. One rule is that there arises a
presumption of a loan.15 Under this rule, one jurisdiction holds
that a wife's laches in enforcing her equitable right to her property
in her husband's hands will bar recovery as against a purchaser with-
out notice of her rights. 16 The other rule is that there arises a pre-
sumption of a gift.17 Under this rule, one jurisdiction holds that,
where the wife voluntarily transfers property to her husband, which
had been under her absolute control, a presumption of gift arises,
but that, where property is in her husband's possession, which had
Tripp, 192 N. C. 211, 134 S. E. 461 (1926). As to whether husband may make
parol gift of interest in land to wife, see 20 GEo. L. J. 533 (1931). Van Hecke
and Lord, Parol Tru.ts in North Carolina (1929) 8 N. C. L. REv. 152. Savings
of husband and wife invested in land in name of wife, presumed gift to wife.
Beck v. Beck, 78 N. J. Eq. 544, 80 Atl. 550, 35 L. R. A. (N. S.) 712 (1911).
There is a presumption of gift in case of transfer by husband to wife be-
cause of his natural obligation to support her. Swendick v. Swendick, supra
at 594.
11 A wife, as creditor of her husband, is, in general, entitled to the same
remedies and .ias the same standing to enforce any security for the payment
of her husband's debt to her as any other creditor. Littler v. Jeffries, 36 Idaho
608, 212 Pac. 866 (1923) ; LoNG, op. cit. .spra note 4, at 248.
, Bast v. Bast, 68 Mont. 69, 217 Pac. 345 (1923) ; LoNrG, op. cit. supra note
4, at 24.
Etheredge v. Cochran, 196 N. C. 681, 146 S. E. 711 (1929) ; Colangelo v.
Colangelo, 46 R. I. 138, 125 At. 285 (1924) noted in (1924) 23 MIcH. L. REv.
301; Gilmore v. Gilmore, 270 Fed. 260 (D. C. Mont. 1921); Stickney v. Stick-
ney, 131 U. S. 227, 9 Sup. Ct. 677, 33 L. ed. 136 (1889); Parrett v. Palmer,
8 Ind. App. 356, 52 Am. St. Rep. 479 (1893). No presumption of gift where
the wife furnishes purchase money for real estate with title taken in hus-
band's name. Wright v. Wright, 242 Ill. 71, 89 N. E. 789 (1909), 26 L. R. A.
(N. S.) 161 (1910). An agreement by the husband to invest separate property
of the wife in land makes him trustee for her benefit. Sparks v. Taylor, 99
Tex. 411, 90 S. W. 485, 6 L. R. A. (N. S.) 381 (1906); Adoue v. Spencer, 62
N. J. Eq. 782, 49 Atl. 10, 90 Am. St. Rep. 484, 56 L. R. A. 817 (1902) ; Brown
v. Wright, 58 Ark. 20, 22 S. W. 1022, 21 L. R. A. 467 (1893).
" Riley v. Martinelli, 97 Cal. 575, 32 Pac. 579, 33 Am. St. Rep. 209, 21
L. R. A. 33 (1893).
2' Nelson v. Wilson, 81 Mont. 560, 264 Pac. 679 (1928) (and no contract or
presumption to pay is implied). Conveyance by wife to husband presumed a
gift. White v. Amenta, 110 Conn. 314, 148 Atl. 345 (1930) ; Hallahan v. Ham-
ilton, 104 N. J. L. 632, 142 AtI. 27 (1928). Money of wife invested in land
in husband's name, presumed a gift. Whitten v. Whitten, 70 W. Va. 422, 74
S. E. 237, 39 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1026 (1912). As against the husband's cred-
itors, clear proof of the husband's prior or contemporaneous promise to repay
money advanced him by the wife or to convey property to her is necessary to
repel a presumption of gift. Am. Finance Co. v. Leedy, 163 S. E. 626 (Vr.
Va. 1932).
88 THE NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
never been under her control, a presumption of gift does not arise.18
The use by the husband of income from the wife's separate estate is
sometimes presumed a gift,1 9 even in those jurisdictions where a
transfer of other property of the wife is presumed to be a loan ;20
likewise, where either spouse improves realty of the other.21
The rule that a loan is presumed is based upon the realization
that a wife commonly intrusts the management of her business to
her husband,22 and the rule that a gift is presumed, upon the con-
tention that "emancipated" woman is afforded the same opportunity
to protect her property rights as is her husband.23
It is submitted that the instant case is not in harmony with the
true intent and purposes of the married women's acts, for it gives
woman a legal equality which stiips her of actual equality. If her
husband gains control of her property, she has the burden of show-
ing it was not given to him. The cases holding that a presumption
of a loan arises recognize that husbands do use their position to gain
control of property of their wives; and those cases protect the actual
independence of the wife and her property by placing on the hus-
band or his creditors the burden of showing it was given to him.
A. E. GARRETT, JR.
Injunctions-Prerequisites for Preliminary Mandatory
Injunctions.
Petitioner, executor under a will, was removed for his refusal to
comply with a court order to account for $80,000 worth of the es-
tate's government bonds which he claimed to be his own. Upon
"Morris v. Westerman, 79 W. Va. 502, 92 S. E. 567 (1917), 3 A. L. R.
1237 (1919); 12 R. C. L. 928.
"Adoue v. Spencer, supra note 15.
Colangelo v. Colangelo, supra note 15; Haymond v. Bledsoe, 11 Ind. App.
202, 38 N. E. 530, 54 Am. St. Rep. 502 (1894) ; Estate of Hauer, 140 Pa. 420,
21 Atl. 445, 23 Am. St. Rep. 245 (1891) ; 13 R. C. L. 1387; see Etheredge v.
Cochran, supra note 15, at 685.
2 Am. Finance Co. v. Leedy, supra note 17. Improvements made during
marriage on separate property of either spouse, although with community
funds, belong to spouse owning the separate property. Dunn v. Mullan, 211
Cal. 583, 296 Pac. 604 (1931), 77 A. L. R. 1015 (1932). Expenditures by
either spouse on the other's property presumed gifts, therefore not basis for
equitable lien. Nixon v. Nixon, 100 N. J. Eq. 437, 135 Atl. 516 (1927);
Anderson v. Anderson, 177 N. C. 401, 99 S. E. 106 (1919). Husband's payment
of mortgage indebtedness on property taken by entireties presumed gift so
far as wife was relieved of contribution. Cunningham v. Cunningham, 158
Md. 372, 148 At!. 444 (1930).
2 Etheredge v. Cochran, supra note 15.
1 Brunswick Bank & Trust Co. v. Valentine, .'upra note 17, at 571.
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affidavits of petitioner's insolvency and fraudulent conduct, the court
granted a preliminary mandatory injunction requiring petitioner to
surrender the bonds to a receiver appointed by the court. The West
Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals denied petitioner's application
for a writ of prohibition to restrain the enforcement of the decree.1
Preliminary injunctions are issued for the purpose of preserving
and protecting the status quo until final determination of the rights
of the parties.2 While a few cases hold that an interlocutory injunc-
tion can only be preventive or prohibitive,3 it is generally held that
equity may in a proper case thus compel the performance of an affirm-
ative act.4 But such power is never exercised, except in a case of
urgent necessity where there is injury or prospective injury to a clear
right and where there is no other adequate remedy for complainant,
who has acted promptly and in good faith. 5 Conversely, where the
propriety of the relief is doubtful it will be denied.6
Preliminary mandatory injunctions have been most frequently
issued where an easement or right of way, or water course, public
or private, has been unlawfully obstructed to complainant's irrep-
1 State ex rel. Donley v. Baker, Judge, 164 S. E. 154 (W. Va. 1932).
2 Toledo, etc., R. Co. v. Pennsylvania Co., 54 Fed. 730 (N. D. Ohio
1893), appeal dismissed, 150 U. S. 393, 14 Sup. Ct. 123, 37 L. ed. 1120 (1893) ;
Powhatan Coal & Coke Co. v. Ritz, 60 W. Va. 395, 56 S. E. 257, 9 L. R. A.
(N. S.) 1225 (1906) ; BISPHAM, PRINCIPLES OF EQUITY" (10th ed. 1923) §400.
3 In Audenreid v. Philadelphia etc., R. Co., 68 Pa. St. 370, 375, 8 Am.
Rep. 195, 196 (1871), Judge Sharswood declared ". . . the authorities, both
in England and this country, are very clear that an interlocutory or prelimi-
nary injunction cannot be mandatory." But see Klein, Mandatory Injunctions
(1898) 12 HAxv. L. RPv. 95, where the author pictorially presents the case for
preliminary mandatory injunctions, with especial emphasis on English cases.
World's Columbian Exposition Co. v. Brennan, 51 Ill. App. 128 (1893)
(obstruction of public way); Rogers Locomotive Works v. Erie Ry. Co.,
20 N. J. Eq. 379 (1869) (possible exception in case of obstruction to ease-
ment); to the effect that a court cannot compel the undoing of an act, see
Washington Univ. v. Green, 1 Md. Ch. 97 (1847); Note (1890) 6 L. R. A.
855, 857.
As to statutory prohibition of mandatory injunctions, see GA. CODE ANN.
(Michie, 1926) §5499. But see (1931) 17 VA. L. REv. 810, 813-814.
'Toledo, etc., R. Co. v. Pennsylvania Co., supra note 2; Pokegama Sugar-
Pine Lumber Co. v. Klamath River Lumber Co., 86 Fed. 528 (C.. C. N. D.
Cal. 1898) ; Leakesville Mills v. Spray Water Power and Land Co., 183 N. C.
511, 112 S. E. 24 (1922) ; cases cited in 32 C. J. 24, §7, note 45; Klein, supra
note 3. Note (1886) 20 Am. Dec. 389, 398.
rPoamoy, EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE (4th ed. 1919) §1359; see cases cited
infra notes 8-16; especially is this so where the act complained of is willful
and fraudulent; Popham v. Wright, 229 S. W. 335 (Tex. Civ. App. 1921).
'National Docks, etc., R. Co. v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 54 N. J. Eq. 10,
33 Atl. 219 (1895) (crossing over another railroad, injunction granted in'
part) ; Florida E. C. Ry. Co. v. Taylor, 56 Fla. 788, 47 So. 345 (1908) (opera-
tion of spur track off regular line).
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arable injury. In such instance equity will order the removal of the
obstruction. 7 Especially is this so where the obstruction was in
violation of a court order.8 Ordinary encroachments will not usually
be disturbed before final hearing,9 but where one has unlawfully
torn down a structure he may be compelled to restore it.10 Pending
final hearing, real or personal property will not be transferred from
one party to another except where the defendant wrongfully obtained
possession and the complainant acted promptly."1 However, the de-
7 Cole Silver Min. Co. v. Va. & Gold Hill Water Co., 1 Sawy. 685, Fed.
Cas. No. 2990 (C. C. D. Nev. 1871) (diversion of subterranean stream used
by complainant) ; Johnson v. Superior Court of Tulare County, 65 Cal. 567, 4
Pac. 575 (1884) (diversion of water by dam); Ryan v. Weiser Valley Land
& Water Co., 20 Idaho 288, 118 Pac. 769 (1911) (alternative of restoring dam
or paying $2,500 and continuing the injury) ; Schneitzius v. Bailey, 45 N. J.
Eq. 178, 13 Atl. 247 (1888) (obstruction to ravine as water course); Car-
penter v. Gold, 88 Va. 551, 14 S. E. 329 (1892) (boundary stream watering
complainant's stock).
Williamson v. McMonagle, 9 Del. Ch. 380, 83 Atl. 139 (1912) (windbreak
across alley used thirty years) ; Zetrouer v. Zetrouer, 89 Fla. 253, 103 So. 625
(1925) (fence across road connecting farm and home); Salisbury v. An-
drews, 128 Mass. 336 (1880) (courtyard providing entrance and lijht);
Hodge v. Giese, 43 N. J. Eq. 342, 11 At. 484 (1887) (access to basement heater
through defendant's shop) ; Leakesville Mills Co. v. Spray Water Power and
Land Co., supra note 4 (right of way from factory to highway) ; Kennedy v.
Klammer, 104 W. Va. 198, 139 S. E. 713 (1927) (fence across street leading
to complainant's property).
Isfiunction denied: Gardner v. Stroever, 81 Cal. 148, 22 Pac. 483 (1889) (ob-
struction to ingress and egress of place of business) ; World's Columbian
Exposition Co. v. Brennan, supra note 3; Dobrinsky v. Boyland, 222 I1. App.
494 (1921) (public road); Ladd v. Flynn, 90 Mich. 181, 51 N. W. 203 (1892)
(line fence obstructing window).
' In Keys v. Alligood, 178 N. C. 16, 100 S. E. 113 (1919) the defendant
obstructed a road in violation of a court order not to interfere with or use
the road except for ingress and egress. A preliminary mandatory injunction
ordered the ditches restored to their former locus.
' Dallas Hunting & Fishing Club v. Dallas County Levee District, 235 S.
W. 607 (Tex. Civ. App. 1921) (levee erected at cost of $400,000, causing
only negligible damage to complainant; Williams v. Silverman Constr. Co., 111
App. Div. 679, 97 N. Y. Supp. 945 (1906) (bay windows projecting over set-
back line); Novi v. Del Prete, 121 Misc. Rep. 637, 202 N. Y. Supp. 86 (1923)
(wall encroachment).101n Pierce v. City of New Orleans, 18 La. Ann. 242 (1865) defendant
was required to restore a boundary wall in which he had unlawfully made
apertures.
1Denial of relief as to real property: Minneapolis & St. L. R. Co. v.
Chicago, M. & St. P. R. Co., 116 Iowa 681, 88 N. W. 1082 (1902) (claim by
purchaser against condemnation claimant); Arnold v. Bright, 41 Mich, 207.
2 N. W. 16 (1879) (lessee for term of years not ousted on ex parte applica-
tion) ; Stephens v. Stephens, 87 Fla. 466, 100 So. 746 (1924) (wife versus
husband owner); State ex rel. Reynolds v. Graves, 66 Neb. 17, 92 N. W.
144 (1902) (administrator of deceased owner versus lessee in possession);
Proctor v. Stuart, 4 Okla. 679, 46 Pac. 501 (1896) (disputing homesteaders).
As to disputes over church property see: Whitecar v. Michenor, 37 N. J. Eq.
6 (1883); Fredericks v. Huber, 180 Pa. 572,- 37 Atl. 90 (1897); Tebo v.
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fendant may be preliminarily dispossessed of personalty if it is being
or is about to be dissipated in violation of the rights of others.1 2 In
case of a clear printa facie breach of duty by a public servant or pub-
lic corporation the court will by interlocutory decree order service to
an individual or the general public where other relief is inadequate.13
Hazel, 74 Atl. 841 (Del. Ch. 1909) (relief denied though defendants were in
possession through wrongful conveyances).
But property was ordered transferred in Pokegama Sugar-Pine Lumber Co.
v. Klamath River Lumber & Improvement Co., supra note 4 (lessors wrong-
fully ousted lessee) ; in Sproat v. Durland, 2 Okla. 24, 35 Pac. 682, dissent
at page 886 (1894) (between homesteaders where one is a trespasser) ; and
in Hodges v. Christmas, 212 S. W. 825 (Tex. Civ. App. 1919), where the
complainant had been forceably and fraudulently ejected from oil land.
Where transfer of personal property was refused: Hutton v. Hammond, 194
Ind. 212, 142 N. E. 427, 32 A. L. R. 888 (1924) (architect's data in his posses-
sion after performance of building contract); Crossland v. Crossland, 53
W. Va. 108, 44 S. E. 424 (1903) (attempt to get the property to sell) ; Spoor-
Thompson Machine Co. v. Bennett Film Laboratories, 105 N. J. Eq. 108,
147 At. 202 (1929) (film-developing machines made under contract, there
being bond to prevent irreparable injury); Moller v. Lincoln Safe Deposit
Co., 174 App. Div. 458, 161 N. Y. Supp. 171 (1916) (access to safe deposit
box in dispute). But wrongfully possessed personalty was transferred in
McCullom v. Morrison, 14 Fla. 414 (1874), where the litigation was over the
location of a Confederate monument unlawfully removed. A mortgagee was
given possession of rolling stock levied upon and about to be dispersed in
impairment of his security. Central Trust Co. v. Moran, 56 Minn. 188,
57 N. W. 471 (1894).
See also Note (1924) 32 A. L. R. 894-918, on transfer of property by pre-
liminary order.
' Ordinarily the defendant must be insolvent or otherwise irresponsible. The
best view requires that the court take custody of the property. Fargo v. Rider,
36 S. W. 340 (Tex. Civ. App. 1896) (irresponsible assignee of fraudulent
vendee required to pay into court money realized from sale of goods);
Murrah v. Shirley, 237 S. W. 307 (Tex. Civ. App. 1922) (money from
check cashed by stakeholder in violation of conditional delivery, the condi-
tion having failed); McCarty v. McCarty, 40 S. W. (2d) 165 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1931) (preservation of community property during divorce proceedings).
Relief was denied in State ex tel. Brookfield Co. v. Mart, 135 Ore. 603, 295
Pac. 459 (1931) (contempt proceedings for failure to turn over warrants and
money to court) ; in Trust Co. of Florida v. Crider, 136 So. 434 (Fla. 1931)
(money from trustee's sale of building and stock); and in Sims v. Stuart,
291 Fed. 707 (S. D. N. Y. 1922) (where customs officer seized money, Hand,
J., seeing no necessity for equity to hurry the legal cause).
" Toledo, etc., R. Co. v. Pennsylvania Co., supra note 4 (railroad traffic
facilities); Mason v. Byrley, 26 Ky. L. Rep. 487, 84 S. W. 767 (1904) (Can-
vassing votes by district committee); Broome v. N. Y. & N. J. Tel. Co.,
42 N. J. Eq. 141, 7 Atl. 851 (1887) (erecting telephone poles unlawfully);
McCran v. Public Service Ry. Co., 95 N. J. Eq. 22, 122 Atl. 205 (1923) (for
street railway service pending mandamus proceedings during strike), discussed
in (1923) 37 HARv. L. REv. 368, at 371; Clinton-Dunn Tel. Co. v. Carolina
Tel. Co., 159 N. C. 9, 74 S. E. 636 (1912) (Hoke, J., discussing the use of
mandamus and preliminary mandatory injunctions); City of Houston v.
Little, 244 S. W. 247 (Tex. Civ. App. 1922) (city school board). See
Farrall v. Hood, 32 S. W. (2d) 480, 482 (Tex. Civ. App. 1930) (attorney
not allowed to see jailed client). Injunction denied in City Council v. Fort
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Preliminary mandatory injunctions in the nature of specific per-
formance, however, issue very rarely.14 Courts occasionally adopt
this form of relief for abating nuisances. 15
The case under discussion has all the prerequisites necessary for
a preliminary mandatory injunction. In view of petitioner's con-
duct, his insolvency, and the possible dissipation of part of the de-
cedent's estate, the court quite properly invoked the provisional rem-
edy to place the bonds in the custody of the court until final hearing.
At that time the petitioner may set up his claim and have his rights
adjudicated. The court wisely took that course in preference to
transferring the property to the other claimants. While the case
turns in part on a West Virginia statute16 providing for the equi-
table protection of property in a case pending, that statute only
strengthens the court's hand.
WM. CAREY PARKER.
Insurance-Incontestable Clause as Defense in Action on
Life Policy.
The plaintiff issued a life insurance policy containing a liability
exemption clause in case insured met his death while engaged in rail-
road employment. A statute provided that life insurance policies
Worth, etc., Contractors, Inc., 8 S. W. (2d) 730 (Tex Civ. App. 1928)
(revocation of plumber's license).
. In Boskowitz v. Cohn, 197 App. Div. 776, 189 N. Y. Supp. 419 (1921)
an injunction ousted sub-lessees where lessees sub-leased in violation of a
condition in their lease giving lessors right to possession without notice in
case of breach, and in Kellerman v. Chase & Co., 101 Fla. 785, 135 So. 127
(1931), the court ordered -performance of contract to deliver tomato crop, it
being highly perishable. See also American Lead Pencil Co. v. Schneegass, 178
Fed. 735 (C. C. N. D. Ga. 1910) where mandatory relief was properly refused.
Where complainant acted in bad faith relief was denied in Winton Motor
Carriage Co. v. Curtis Pub. Co., 196 Fed. 906 (E. D. Pa. 1912) )contract for
commercial advertising in periodical). Accord: Amalgamated Furniture Fac-
tories, Inc. v. Rochester Times-Union, Inc., 128 Misc. Rep. 673, 219 N. Y.
Supp. 705 (1927).
"Pennsylvania R. Co. v. Kelley, 77 N. J. Eq. 129, 75 Atl. 758 (1910) (de-
fective building a public and private nuisance which must be removed or
repaired) ; Salisbury v. Andrews, 128 Mass. 336 (1880) (light and sunshine
shut out by alley obstruction) ; Pierce v. City of New Orleans, supra note 11;
relief refused in Ort v. Bowden, 148 S. W. 1145 (Tex. Civ. App. 1912) (base-
ball park blocking street).
-*2W. VA. CODE (1931) c. 53, art. 6, §1: "A court of equity may, in a proper
case pending therein, in which funds or property of a corporation, firm or
person is involved, and there is danger of the loss or misappropriation of the
same or a material part thereof, appoint a special receiver of such funds or
property, or of the rents, issues and profits thereof, or both, who shall give
bond with good security to be approved by the court. .. 
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should be incontestable, for any reason save nonpayment of premiums
and military service, one year from date of issue.' The insured was
killed in railroad employment more than one year after issuance, and
this suit was instituted to cancel the policy.2 Held: The defense of
incontestability was not good since the action was not a contest of
the policy (i.e., a denial of it), but an insistence upon its terms.3
On the theory that an insurance company may assume only such
risks as it sees fit,4 the decision appears both clear and reasonable
and represents the majority view in the United States.5
Incontestable clauses in life insurance policies are required in
twenty-five- states.8 By way of inducement to purchasers of insur-
ance, companies voluntarily insert similar provisions in policies sold
elsewhere.7 With few exceptions statute-prescribed clauses are uni-
form.8 They allow a two year contestable period and permit after
IVA. CoDE ANN. (Michie, 1930) §4228.
2United Security Life Ins. & Trust Co. v. Massey, 164 S. E. 529 (Va.
1932). The policy was a fifteen year endowment life insurance contract
which provided that the insurer advance the sum of the policy, $5,000, to the
insured immediately. The latter agreed to pay $51.75 per month for fifteen
years should he live that long; but in case of death the obligation was to be
discharged. By way of security the insured gave a bond in the penalty of
$10,000 and a deed of trust on certain real estate.
"The incontestable clause should be construed merely as an agreement
on the part of the'insurer not to contest the validity of the policy as written."
VANCE, INSURANCE (2d ed. 1930) 281, citing Sipp v. Philadelphia Life Ins.
Co., 293 Pa. 292, 142 Ati. 221 (1928). *
"... a policy of insurance is' a voluntary contract. Nearly any kind of
agreement that is not contrary to law or public policy may be included therein.
An insurer may impose such conditions as it desires and the insured may take
them or go without the policy, as it may choose." Whitney v. Union Central
Life Ins. Co., 47 F. (2d) 861, 864 (C. C. A. 8th, 1931).
'American Trust Co. v. Life Ins. Co. of Va., 173 N. C. 558, 92 S. E. 706
(1917); Dibble v. Reliable Life Ins. Co., 170 Cal. 199, 149 Pac. 171 (1915).
'Ala., Ariz., Colo., Idaho, Ill., Ind., Kan., Me., Mass., Mich., Minn., Neb.,
N. H., N. J., N. M., N. Y., N. D., Okla., Ore., Pa., Tenn., Utah, Vt., Va., and
Wyo. North Carolina has no suich statute. An excellent interpretation of a
voluntarily inserted clause is to be found in American Trust Co. v. Life Ins.
Co. of Va., supra note 5.
7 "Premiums upon life policies are often paid at a great sacrifice, and one
of the most disturbing and unsatisfactory features of the insurance contract
is the fact that after the sacrifices and payments have been made for a num-
ber of years, and the insured has died, so that his testimony and perhaps that
of others has been rendered unavailable by the lapse of time and the occur-
rence of death, instead of receiving the promised reward, the beneficiary will
be met with a contest and a lawsuit to determine whether the insurance ever
had any validity or force. Hence it has 'become an almost universal practice
with insurance companies to provide against any contest or forfeiture of their
policies after a certain length of time, greater in some cases and less in
others." Clement v. New York Life Ins. Co., 101 Tenn. 22, 46 S. W. 561, 562(1898).
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that time the specific defenses of nonpayment of premiums and mil-
itary service.P Self-imposed incontestability clauses contain pro-
visions similar to those prescribed by statute.10 They do, however,
often provide broader defenses, and sometimes waive the period of
contestability altogether."
Interpretation of incontestability clauses, both mandatory and
voluntary, has not been uniform.12 Courts differ as to what consti-
tutes a sufficient contest of the policy, a substantial majority holding
that court action is necessary, such as instituting a suit for cancel-
lation or filing an answer to a suit brought on the policy.'8 A few
courts have held that a definite and positive repudiation of the policy
plus a tender of the premiums paid is sufficient.14 Most courts hold
that the contestable period runs its course irrespective of the in-
sured's death beforehand ;15 but they allow a suspension of the run-
ning of the period from the time of the insured's death to the ap-
pointment of his administrator, for in the interim there is no one
8 A typical example of incontestability statutes is found in Indiana: "... the
policy shall be incontestable after it shall have been in force during the life-
time of the insured for two years from its date, except for nonpayment of
premiums and except for violation of the conditions of the policy relating to
naval and military service in time of war." IND. ANN. STAT. (Burns, 1926)
§9036 (3). The Virginia statute provides a one year period only. VA. CODE
ANN. (Michie, 1930) §4228. Alabama sets the final date of contestability
"after two annual premium payments have been made." ALA. CODE (Michie,
1928) §8365.
9 Supra note 8.
" Hardy v. Phoenix Mutual Life Ins. Co., 180 N. C. 180, 104 S. E. 166
(1920).
"Union Central Life Ins. Co. v. Fox, 106 Tenn. 347, 61 S. W. 62 (1901)
was a contest of a policy which provided for incontestability for any reason
other than misstatement of age, and was to take effect upon issuance. (This
case arose before the adoption of the Tennessee incontestable statute.)
"This is to be expected since all clauses do not embody the same provisions
and all courts do not maintain the same attitude toward insurance companies.
"In Northwestern Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Pickering, 293 Fed. 496, 499
(C. C. A. 5th, 1923), it was said that "a contest so provided for imports
litigation, the invoking of judicial action to cancel or prevent the enforcement
of the policy, either by a suit to that end, or.by a defense.to an action on the
policy. A mere denial or repudiation by the insurer of its liability under the
policy, accompanied by a tender of the premiums paid, is not a contest, within
the meaning of the provision." Missouri State Life Ins. Co. v. Cranford, 161
Ark. 602, 257 S.W. 66 (1923).
" Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Rose, 294 Fed. 122 (E. D. Ky. 1923).
"Plotner v. Northwestern Nat. Life Ins. Co., 48 N. D. 295, 183 N. W.
1000 (1921). This case is discussed with approval in (1921) 20 Mici. L. Rsv.
111. Monahan v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 283 Ill. 136, 119 N. E. 68 (1918).
This line of cases is based on the reasoning that such interpretation is in ac-
cord with the intent of the parties as expressed in the plain language of the
policies.
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against whom the insurer can bring suit.16 Some, however, take the
position that death under these circumstances stops the running of
the period.17
It is not necessarily true that an incontestability clause denies the
insurer, after the expiration of the period of contestability, all de-
fenses not specifically excepted.' 8 Courts allow the defense of lack
of insurable interest19 even after the period of contestability20 on
the ground that wager policies are contrary to public policy. 21 After
the contestable period has expired fraud is universally denied as a
defense.22 When policies are made incontestable from date of issue,
some courts allow a reasonable time in which to interpose this de-
fense.23 Others, however, construe these policies in their strictest
terms and deny relief.2 4
WILSON BARBER.
"Jensen v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 251 N. Y. 336, 167 N. E. 462(1929); Ramsay v. Old Colony Life Ins. Co., 297 Ill. 592, 131 N. E. 108
(1921).
17 Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Stevens, 157 Minn. 253, 195 N. W. 913 (1923).
'This would appear so from the face of the policy. Implications of law
are not, of course, printed in the policy. Infra note 19. In Elwood v. New
England Mutual Life Ins. Co., 158 At. 257 (Pa. 1931), an exceptional de-
fense was allowed an insurer in an action on a -policy containing an incon-
testable clause. The plaintiff made an unsuccessful attempt to take his life,
but only maimed himself. His suit to collect damages was denied on the
grounds of being opposed to public policy.
"What amounts to an insurable interest is a problem of considerable diffi-
culty. See VANcE, INsURANcE (2d ed. 1930) 147-164.
* Clearly the defense would be a good one before the expiration of the
period.
1 Dakota Life Ins. Co. v. Midland Nat. Bank of Minneapolis, 18 F. (2d)
903 (C. C. A. 8th, 1927); Bromley's Adm. v. Washington Life Ins. Co., 122
Ky. 402, 92 S. W. 17 (1906). A case contra is cited and discussed in (1931)
19 GEo. L. J. 501, that of Bogacki v. Great West Life Assurance Co., 253
Mich. 253, 234"N. W. 865 (1931). This case cites as its authority Wright v.
Mutual Benefit Asso., 188 N. Y. 237, 23 N. E. 186, 16 Am. St. Rep. 794(1890), but this is a doubtful precedent since the defense of lack of an in-
surable interest was not pressed, and the opinion of the court proceeded on
other grounds.
'Wright v. Mutual Benefit Asso., supra note 21. Incontestability clauses
are said to be in the nature of short statutes of limitation, and are not contrary
to public policy as condoning fraud. Drews v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 79
N. J. L. 398, 75 Atl. 167 (1910); Hardy v. Phoenix Mutual Life Ins. Co.,
supra note 10. Note (1920) 6 A. L. R. 448.
Reagan v. Mutual Life Ins. Co., 189 Mass. 555, 76 N. E. 217 (1905).
MacKendree v. Southern States Life Ins. Co., 112 S. C. 335, 99 S. E.
806 (1919); Duvall v. Nat. Ins. Co., 28 Idaho 356, 154 Pac. 632 (1916).
Note (1920) 6 A. L. R. 448.
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Mortgages- 1Suretyship Where Grantee of Mortgagor
Assumes Mortgage Debt.
Defendant's testator purchased certain land and gave his note for
a portion of the purchase price, executing at the same time a deed of
trust to secure the note. Subsequently he sold the land and the
grantee -"assumed" the mortgage debt. After this the mortgagee
without the consent of the mortgagor-defendant released a portion
of the land from the mortgage lien. Plaintiff as assignee of the
mortgagee brought an action to recover on the note. Defendant con-
tended that when the grantee assumed the obligation, the grantee be-
came the principal debtor, he (the mortgagor) his surety, and that
therefore the release of the land by the mortgagee released him from
liability. Held: The relation of principal and surety existed only be-
tween the mortgagor and grantee, and the mortgagee's rights were
not affected by the release of the property.1
It is generally held that where the purchaser of an equity of re-
demption promises the mortgagor to assume the mortgage debt, he
becomes personally liable to the mortgagor or his assignee for the
payment of the debt itself or for the deficiency after foreclosure.2
But a purchase of the equity "subject to" the mortgage does not
amount to an assumption and the mortgagee has no personal action
against the grantee on the debt.3 In both cases, however, the mort-
gagor remains personally liable to the mortgagee.
Where the grantee "assumes" the obligation, all of the cases
found, except the principal case, hold that the grantee becomes the
principal debtor and the mortgagor his surety, not only as between
these two parties but as to the mortgagee as well.4 If the mortgagee
Brown v. Turner, 202 N. C. 227, 162 S. E. 608 (1932).
2 In North Carolina, at one time, the result could be obtained only upon the
equitable theory of subrogation. Woodcock v. Bostic, 118 N. C. 822, 24
S. E. 362 (1896) (third-party beneficiary theory rejected, mortgagee's rights not
assignable); Baber v. Hanie, 163 N. C. 588, 80 S. E. 57 (1913) (assignee
protected, third-party beneficiary theory rejected). Since 1920, however, the
mortgagee may sue on a third-party beneficiary contract basis. Rector v.
Lyda, 180 N. C. 577, 105 S. E. 170 (1920); Parlier v. Miller, 186 N. C. 501,
119 S. E. 898 (1923) ; Coxe v. Dillard, 197 N. C. 344, 148 S. E. 545 (1929) ;
Sanders v. Griffin, 191 N. C. 447, 452, 132 S. E. 157 (1926) ; Keller v. Parrish,
196 N. C. 733, 147 S. E. 9 (1929) ; (1929) 8 N. C. L. REv. 85.
'Harvey v. Kinston Knitting Co., 197 N. C. 177, 148 S. E. 45 (1929) ; (1929)
8 N. C. L. REv. 85.
'The court in White v. Augello, 142 Misc. Rep. 233, 254 N. Y. Supp. 228
(1931), lays down the rule as follows: "When in a deed a grantee assumes and
agrees to pay, as a part of the consideration of the grant, a mortgage upon
the premises conveyed, the relationship of the mortgagor to the mortgagee is,
as between himself and the grantee, altered; the mortgagor ceases to be the
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learns of the transaction, a complete suretyship contract is then in
existence; and if the mortgagee and grantee deal with the property
so as to injure the mortgagor, without his consent, he is released to
the extent of his injury.5 Accordingly, it is held that where the
mortgagee releases all the property securing the debt the mortgagor
is entirely released.6 In case he releases only a portion of the prop-
erty, the mortgagor is entitled to have the mortgage credited in an
amount equal to'the value of the property released. 7 Also, a binding
extension of time by the mortgagee, since it prevents the mortgagor
from paying the debt and becoming immediately subrogated to the
rights of the mortgagee, releases the mortgagor.8 And where the
mortgagee releases the grantee from personal liability, agreeing to
look only to the security for payment, the mortgagor is released be-
cause he could not go against the grantee for any deficiency. 9
The court in the principal case places considerable weight upon
the fact that the mortgagee could proceed against the mortgagor on
principal obligor, and takes on the relationship of a surety, while a grantee
who has assumed and agreed to pay the mortgage becomes the principal
debtor." Meldola v. Furlong, 142 Misc. Rep. 562, 255 N. Y. Supp. 48 (1932) ;
Harden v. First Nat. Bank, 6 Pac. (2d) 1060 (Okla. 1932); Miss. Valley
Trust Co. v. Bussey, 49 F. (2d) 881 (C. C. A. 5th, 1931); Farmers & Mer-
chants Bank v. Narvid, 259 Ill. App. 554 (1931); Reeves v. Cordes, 108 N.
J. Eq. 469, 155 Atl. 547 (1931); Harris v. DePaulina, 40 Ohio App. 57, 178
N. E. 225 (1931).
'Meldola v. Furlong, Reeves v. Cordes, both supra note 4; Blumenthal v.
Serota 155 At. 40 (Me. 1931); Bingna v. Bell, 259 Ill. App. 361 (1930);
Harris v. Atchison, 183 Minn. 292, 236 N. W. 458 (1931) ; Grace v. Wilson,
139 Misc. Rep. 757, 250 N. Y. Supp. 212 (1931); In re Roth, 272 Fed. 516
(N. D. Ohio 1920); Insley v. Webb, 122 Wash. 98, 209 Pac. 1093 (1922);
Gilliam v. McLemore, 141 Miss. 253,-106 So. 99 (1925).
It is usually held, however, that mere negligence on the part of the creditor
resulting in the loss of the security will not release the surety. Fuller v.
Tomlinson Bros., 58 Iowa 111, 12 N. W. 127 (i882); Schroeppell v. Shaw,
3 N. Y. 446 (1849); Newcolnb v. Hale, 90 N. Y. 326, 43 Am. Rep. 173(1882) ; Taylor v. Bridger, 185 N. C. 85, 116 S. E. 94 (1923).
' Crisman v. Lanterman, 149 Cal. 647, 87 Pac. 89, 117 Am. St. Rep. 167(1906); Jordon v. Bullard, 145 'Ga. 890, 90 S. E. 41 (1916); Heidahl v.
Geiser Mfg. Co., 112 Minn. 319, 127 N. W. 1050, 140 Am. St. Rep. 493 (1910).
" In In re Hunter, 257 Pa. 32, 101 Atl. 79, 80 (1917), the court said: "Where
the mortgagor has parted with his title to the mortgaged premises, a release
of a part thereof by the mortgagee, without the knowledge or consent of the
mortgagor, will.discharge the latter from personal liability for any loss to
the mortgagee resulting from a deficiency in the proceeds of a subsequent
sale in foreclosure proceedings." Meigs v. Tunnicliffe, 214 Pa. 495, 63 AtI.
1019, 112 Am. St. Rep. 769 (1906); Norton v. Henry, 67 Vt. 308, 31 Atl.
787 (1895).
'Meldola v. Furlong, Miss. Valley Trust Co. v. Bussey, both supra note 4;
Bingna v. Bell, Blumenthal v. Serota, 'Harris v. Atchison, Grace v. Wilson,
all supra note 5.
"In re Roth, Insley v. Webb,. Gilliam v. McLemore, all supra note 5.
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the debt without first resorting to the security or the grantee. But
that is true in any surety contract. It in no way affects the creditor's
duty to retain the security for the mortgagor. If the surety pays he
has a right under the doctrine of.subrogation to have the debt and
the security assigned to him.' 0 If the security has been released the
assignment can only operate as an assignment of an unsecured debt
leaving the mortgagor dependent upon the general assets of the
grantee on an equal basis with other creditors. Such a result is
inconsistent with the mortgagor's contract and would, in a great
many cases, result in a total loss of the debt.
The result of the decision might be justified in fairness on the
ground that the mortgagor was not prejudiced. For the unreleased
portion of the land was sufficient to satisfy the obligation. It would
seem, however, that the rule announced would render the sale of an
equity of redemption extremely hazardous to the mortgagor and thus
menace this type of security transaction.
Winston-Salem, N. C. DALLACE MCLENNAN.
Negligence-Statutory Measure of Damages For
Wrongful Death.
A twelve-year-old boy who contributed to his mother's support
by carrying papers was killed by what was at most ordinary neg-
ligence on the part of the defendant. In an action by the mother,
held, under the wrongful death statute of Georgia, the plaintiff may
recover the full value of the life of the child upon whom she was
dependent, or who contributed to her support.'
The Georgia statute provides for a recovery for the death of a
husband, wife, or parent in any event, and for the death of a child
if at least partial dependency is shown,2 where the death is caused
"
0In In re Roth, supra note 5, at 520, the court says: "The mortgagor, like
tny other surety called upon to make payment, is entitled to have surrendered
unimpaired all securities and remedies which the creditor holds, including in
this case both the mortgage and the personal obligation of the Lumber Com-
pany to pay the mortgagor's debt to the Supply Company." Schenectady Say.
Bank v. Ashton, 205 App. Div. 781, 200 N. Y. Supp. 245 (1923) ; Cooper v.
Jewett, 233 Fed. 618, (C. C. A. 8th, 1916); O'Neill v. Russell, 192 Wis.
141, 212 N. W. 278 (1927) ; Stevens v. First Nat. Bank, 117 Okla. 148, 245
Pac. 567 (1925).
In North Carolina it is held that where the surety pays the creditor, the security
must be assigned to a trustee or else the payment operates as a satisfaction and
in no other way can it be kept alive. Tiddy v. Harris, 101 N. C. 589, 8 S. E.
227 (1888) ; Peebles v. Gay, 115 N. C. 38, 20 S. E. 173 (1894).
' Michael v. Western & Atlantic R. Co., 165.S. E. 37 (Ga. 1932).
, See Central of Georgia. R. Co. v. Henson, 121 Ga. 462, 463, 49 S. E. 278
(1904) ("partial dependence upon the child's labor, accompanied by substantial
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by a crime or by criminal or other negligence. 3 It further provides
that the measure of damages shall be the full value of the life of the
deceased without deduction for the necessary or other personal ex-
penses of the deceased had he lived.
4
A recovery of the full value of the life of the deceased, irrespec-
tive of the pecuniary loss to the person entitled to recover, is a re-
covery of exemplary damages, and the Georgia court has specifically
recognized this fact.5 Nevertheless, such recovery has been per-
mitted in many cases where the defendant was guilty of only ordinary
negligence.6
The general (and common law) rule of the measure of damages
is strict compensation for the pecuniary loss suffered by the plain-
tiff,7 with exemplary damages permitted only where the defendant
was guilty of at least gross negligence in the sense of culpable indif-
ference to consequences." It is a well established rule of the com-
mon law that ordinary negligence is not enough to justify the inflic-
tion of exemplary damages.9 The Georgia provision is clearly con-
trary to this established common law rule and no similar provision
has been found in the wrongful death statutes of any other state.
At common law no right of action survived to any person for a
wrongful death.10  The right originated with Lord Campbell's Act,"
contribution therefrom to the maintenance of the plaintiff, is sufficient") ; Fuller
v. Inman, 10 Ga. App. 680, 684, 74 S. E. 287, 291 (1912) ("If he performs
substantial services of which she receives the benefit in and about the house-
hold, this is a contribution to her support, and she is dependent upon that
child, within meaning of the law, without reference to whether he contributes
one penny to her support").
8 GA. CODE ANN. (Michie, 1930) §4424.
'GA. CODE ANN. (Michie, 1930) §4425.
5 See Georgia Railroad and Banking Co. v. Spinks, 111 Ga. 571, 36 S. E.
855 (1900); Central of Georgia R. Co. v. Swann, 19 Ga. App. 691, 91 S. E.
1068, 1069 (1917). ("The statute with which we are dealing, being in deroga-
tion of the common law, must be strictly construed. The act is partly punitive
and partly compensatory"); Michael v. Western and Atlantic R. Co., supra
note 1.8Atlantic Coast Line R. Co. v. McDonald, 135 Ga. 635, 70 S. E. 249
(1910); Seaboard Air Line R. Co. v. Young, 40 Ga. App. 4, 148 S. E. 757
(1929); Western & Atlantic R. Co. v. Gray, 172 Ga. 286, 157 S. E. 48?
(1931).
7 1 SEDGwICK, DAMAGES (9th ed. 1920) §30.
'Reed v. Keith, 99 Wis. 672, 75 N. W. 392 (1898) ; Cotton v. Fisheries
Products Co., 181 N. C. 151, 106 S. E. 487 (1921) ; 1 SEDGWICK, op. cit. supra
note 7, §363.
' Denver and R. G. R. Co. v. Roller, 100 Fed. 738, 49 L. R. A. 77 (C. C. A.
9th, 1900); Coley v. North Carolina R. Co., 129 N. C. 407, 40 S. E. 195,
57 L. R. A. 817 (1901); 1 SEaowicK,.loc cit. supra note 8.
20 The Mobile Life Insurance Co. v. Brame, 95 U. S. 754, 24 L. ed. 580
(1878); 2 SFmGwcK, op. cit. supra note 7, §570.
219 & 10 VicT., c. 93 (1842).
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and similar statutes have been enacted in almost every jurisdiction of
the United States.' 2 Several of the states have provided for this
right in their constitutions.' 3 These statutes are all similar in sub-
stance with some differences as respects: (1) the party in whose
name the action is to be brought ;14 (2) the distribution of the sum
recovered;15 and (3) the limit of the sum recoverable."o
As to provisions for the measure of damages, these statutes may
be divided into four classes:
(1) Those in which the recovery is based strictly on compen-
sation.' 7 No exemplary damages are permitted however culpable
the act.' 8 This type of provision is found in more than half of the
states. It seems to be the better rule in that the plaintiff is fully
recompensed, in so far as money can compensate for the loss, and
the defendant is not subject to double punishment by way of ex-
emplary damages and a possible criminal action.
(2) Those in which the recbvery is based on compensation plus
such exemplary damages as the degree of culpability merits. In
some statutes, such exemplary damages are specifically provided
A careful search of the statute books showed that such a provision has
been enacted in every state except Louisiana. However, Lduisiana permits
an action for a wrongful death. Aymond v. Western Union Tel. Co., 151
La. 184, 91 So. 671 (1922).
For example, N. Y. Const., Art. 1, §18: "The right of action now existing
to recover damages for injuries resulting in death, shall never be abrogated;
and the amount recoverable shall not be subject to any statutory limitation".
I Most of the statutes require the action to be brought by the personal repre-
sentative for the benefit of the designated beneficiaries. For example, VA.
CoDE ANN. (Michie, 1930) §5787. A few require the action to be brought
by the real party in interest. For example, GA. CODE ANN (Michie, 1926)
§4424.
" In every jurisdiction except Oregon it is provided that the damages re-
covered are free from the debts and liabilities of the deceased, and certain
persons are designated as the beneficiaries. For example, N. C. CoDE ANN.
(Michie, 1931) §160. The Oregon statute, however, provides that "the amount
recovered, if any, shall be administered as other personal property of the
deceased person." Oma. CODE ANN. (1930) §5-703.
"The great majority of the statutes have not provided a limit to the sum
recoverable, and some states have provided in their constitutions that no such
limit may be established. For example, N. Y. Const., supra note 13. Other
statutes limit the amount that may be recovered to a specified sum, in most
cases $10,000. For example, KAN. Rxv. STAT. ANN. (1923) c. 60, §3203.
2 For example, MicH. Comp. LAWS (1929) §14062, "... and in every action
the jury may give such damages as they shall deem fair and just, with refer-
ence to the pecuniary injury resulting from such death, to those persons who
may be entitled to such damages when recovered." N. C. CoDE ANN.
(Michie, 1931) §161.
I Western Union Tel Co. v. Catlett, 177 Fed. 71 (C. C. A. 4th, 1910); see
Bradley v. Ohio River & C. R. Co., 122 N. C. 972, 975, 30 S. E. 8 (1898).
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for,19 while in others the result is attained by judicial decision under
a clause in the wrongful death statute which provides for just dam-
ages without limiting to pecuniary loss. 20 This type of provision is
found in about twenty states. It is most analogous to the aforemen-
tioned common law rule of damages, but is open to the objection that
it gives the plaintiff more than he has lost, and subjects the de-
fendant to the possibility of double punishment.
(3) Those statutes in which the recovery is based solely on the
degree of culpability. This provision is found only in Massachu-
setts, 2 1 by a specific clause, and in Alabama by judicial decision. 22
This rule is most fair to the defendant, as he pays according to the
degree of his wrong. It is, however, furthest from the original ob-
ject of damages, i. e., compensation.
(4) Those in which the recovery is given for the full value of the
life. The Georgia statute stands alone in this class.2 3 This provision
is similar to those of the first class in that the measure of damages
is the same regardless of the degree of culpability. The first class
denies exemplary damages even where death was the result of a
wilful assault ;24 the fourth class gives exemplary damages even
where the death resulted from ordinary negligence alone.25
Despite the great differences in the statutory provisions and the
variations from the common law rule of damages, these statutes have
been uniformly held valid. 28 Apparently there is nothing.to prevent
the legislature from providing for any measure of damages it may
deem desirable, and the court, in the instant case, is correct in its con-
clusion that it is clearly within the power of the legislature to permit
recovery of exemplary damages for homicide resulting from ordinary
" For example, TEX. Rr v. CIV. CODE (Vernon, 1925) art. 4673: "When the
death is caused by the wilful act or omission, or gross negligence of the defen-
dant, exemplary as well as actual damages may be recovered."
Matthews v. Warner's Adm'r., 29 Gratt. 570, 26 Am. Rep. 396 (Va. 1877).
SMAss. GEN. LAWS (1921) c. 229, §5: "... damages to be assessed with
reference to the degree of his culpability."
'Dowling v. Garner, 195 Ala. 493, 10 So. 150 (1915); Alabama Power
Co. v. Talmadge, 207 Ala. 86, 93 So. 548 (1921).
" Supra notes 3 & 4.
" Supra note 17.
Supra note 6.
3 U. S. Cast Iron Pipe and Foundry Co. v. .Sullivan; 3 F. (2d) 794 (C. C.
A. 5th, 1925); Alabama Power Co. v. Talmadge, 207 Ala. 86, 93 So. 549
(1921); Shaffer v. Chicago, R. 1. & P. P. Co., 300 Mo. 477, 254 S. W. 257
(1923) ; aff'd 263 U. S. 687, 44 S. Ct. 228, 68 L. ed. 507 (1924) ; Hull v.
Seaboard Air Line R. Co., 76 S. C. 278, 57 S. E. 28, 10 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1213
(1907); Michael v. Western & Atl. R. Co., 165 S. E. 37 (Ga. 1932).
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negligence, as well as for homicide resulting from wanton, wilful or
criminal negligence.27
IRviN E. ERB.
Public Utilities--When a Utility May Withhold or Withdraw
Service For Reasons of Credit.
Where, upon the payment of the usual fee, a telephone company
refused to furnish its service without an additional deposit, on the
ground that plaintiff was admittedly a bad credit risk, held, the com-
pany must serve the plaintiff without the additional security on the
same terms as it serves other subscribers.'
It is almost universally conceded that a public utility may with-
draw and withhold its service for nonpayment of a recent and just
bill, since collection by legal process is practically prohibitive. And
this is so even though the consumer has some counterclaim against
the company.2 But although the bill be legitimate, where the sum is
owed by a public agency, the corporation may not use the summary
method employed in collecting its debts from delinquent individuals,
since here mandamus will lie to compel the proper official to pay the
bill.$ Another instance where. the courts will enjoin a public utility
from withholding service for nonpayment of a recent bill is where the
refusal to pay is on the ground that its service has been inadequate.4
And where the bill is bona fide in dispute, the company may not re-
fuse to serve the consumer until such bill is paid.3 The courts are
very reluctant to permit the corporation to be its own judge and jury
' Micba~l v. Western & Atlantic R. Co., 165 S. E. 37, 43 (Ga. 1932).
'Horton v. Interstate Tel. & Tel. Co., 202 N. C. 610, 163 S. E. 694 (1932).
The court explains its decision on the ground that the rule requiring an addi-
tional deposit by bad. risks had never been approved by the Corporation Com-
mission. It takes no definite stand, but intimates in a nebulous manner, that
in the absence of such fact, it might have reached a contrary result.
'Barrett v. Broad River Power Co., 146 S. C. 85, 143 S. E. 650 (1928);
Central La. Power Co. v. Thomas, 145 Miss. 352, 110 So. 673 (1927) ; Buffalo
County Tel. Co. v. Turner, 82 Neb. 841, 118 N. W. 1064 (1908); Irvin v.
Rushville Co-operative Tel. Co., 161 Ind. 524, 69 N. E. 258 (1903).
' Board of Education v. Richmond, 137 N. Y. Supp. 62 (1912) (water supply
in a school) ; People ex rel. Johnson v. Barrows, 124 N. Y. Supp. 270 (1910)
(water supply of public park).
'Mays v. Hutchinson, P. U. R. 1931B 104 (Pa. 1930); Case v. Meadow
Lawn Tel. Co., P. U. R. 1929A 421 (Minn. 1928); State ex rel. Payne v.
Kuloch Tel. Co., 93 Mo. App. 349, 67 S. W. 684 (1902) ; McEntee v. Kingston
Water Co., 165 N. Y. 27, 58 N. E. 785 (1900).
'O'Neal v. Citizen's Pub. Service Co., 157 S. C. 320, 154 S. E. 217 (1930);
Ala. Water Service Co. v. Harris, 221 Ala. 516, 129 So. 5 (1930); Dodd v.
City of Atlanta, 154 Ga. 33, 113 S. E. 166 (1922) ; Poole v. Paris Mt. Water
Co., 81 S. C. 438, 62 S. E. 874 (1908).
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and coerce the recalcitrant one into submission by denying him serv-
ice. But if the consumer, refusing to pay the bill because of his
bona fide belief that it is unjust, has his service discontinued, he is
not entitled to damages merely because of his belief, if it is proved
that the bill is in fact correct. 6 Nor may a utility withdraw its serv-
ice for nonpayment of an unreasonable, 7 discriminatory, s or obviously
excessive charge.9
Some courts hold that the payment of arrearages for service at
the same place is not required and the only condition precedent to a
right to have the service is a tender for it.1O Others say that the
payment of arrearages may be demanded before service is ex-
tended.1 But where an old bill has been passed over and later ones
accepted, the company is said to have waived its right to discontinue
service for nonpayment.12
It is generally held that service cannot be refused at one place
because the consumer is in arrears at another place at the same
time1 3 or because he was in arrears at a different place.14 'Nor can
the company urge another's default as an excuse for withholding
'Kentucky Utilities Co. v. Warren Ellison Cafe, 231 Ky. 538, 21 S. W. (2d)
976 (1929).
Barrell v. Lake Forest Water Co., 191 Ill. App. 269 (1915); Ball v. Tex-
arkana Water Corp., 127 S. W. 1068 (Tex. Civ. App. 1910); Borough of
Washington v. Washington Water Co., 70 N. J. Eq. 254, 62 Atl. 390 (1905).
SGordon & Ferguson v. Doran, 100 Minn. 343, 111 N. W. 272 (1907).
' Pond v. New Rochelle Water Co., 183 N. Y. 330, 76 N. E. 211 (1906);
Horsky v. Helena Consolidated Water Co., 13 Mont. 229, 33 Pac. 689 (1893).
'
0 Johnson v. Carolina Gas & Electric Co., 106 .S. C. 447, 91 S. E. 734
(1917); Taylor v. N. Y. Tel. Co., 160 N. Y. Supp. 865 (1916); Danaher v.
S. W. Tel. & Tel. Co., 94 Ark. 533, 127 S. W. 963 (1910); S. W. Tel. & Tel.
Co. v. Luckett, 127 S. W. 856 (Tex. Civ. App. 1910); Crumley v. Watauga
Water Co., 99 Tenn. 420, 41 S. W. 1058 (1897).
"Bailey v. Interstate Power Co., 209 Iowa 631, 228 N. W. 644 (1930).
State ex rel. Latshaw v. Board of Water & Light Commissioners, 105 Minn.
472, 117 N. W. 827 (1908).
" Crumley v. Watauga Water Co., supra note 10; Wood v. City of Auburn,
87 Me. 287, 32 AtI. 906 (1895). Contra: Mackin v. Portland Gas Co., 38
Ore. 120, 61 Pac. 134 (1900) ; People ex rel. Kennedy v. Manhattan Gaslight
Co., 45 Barb. 136 (N. Y. 1865).
23Texas Central Power Co. v. Perez, 291 S. W. 622 (Tex. Civ. App. 1927)
(a store owner in debt for outside lights); Merill v. Liverm6re Falls Light
& Power Co., 117 Me. 523, 105 Atl. 120 (1918) (a business man in default
at his residence) ; Gaslight Co. of Baltimore v. Colliday, 25 Md. 1 (1866)
(owner of several pieces of property in default on one).
"Miller v. Roswell Gas & Elect. Co., 22 N. M. 594, 166 Pac. 1177 (1917);
Benson v. Paris Mt. Water Co., 88 S. C. 351, 70 S. E. 897 (1911); Hatch v.
Consumers' Co., 17 Idaho 204, 104 Pac. 670 (1909) ; Mackin v. Portland Gas
Co., supra note 12; Lloyd v. Washington Gaslight Co., 1 Mackey 331 (D. C.
1881). Contra: Clark v. Utica Gas & Electric Co., 231 N. Y. Supp. 308 (1928);
Jones v. Mayor of Nashville, 109 Tenn. 550, 72 S. W. 985 (1903).
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service even though such other person is the consumer's husband'5
or wife.' 0 And in the absence of express statutory provision mak-
ing a service charge a lien on the premises, a new customer cannot
be denied service because of the default of the landlord' 7 or previous
tenant.18
Where it is impossible to serve a prospective customer without at
the same time supplying one not entitled to service because of non-
payment, the utility is released from its duty.19 The opposite view,
however, has been recognized; and one court has held that the lessee
of part of a room, where he applies for it in good faith, is entitled
to service, although the lessor, occupying the remainder of the room,
is in default.20
When the question of the general credit of the person is involved
and payment in advance is not required by the company, some courts
have said that a bad financial risk would justify the company in ask-
ing for security before extending service.21 And demanding pay-
ment in advance from one financially irresponsible is permissible
even when such payment is not demanded of others.22 But it has
been held, in accord with the principal case, that where a person
offered to pay in advance, a company could not withhold service be-
cause of that person's credit rating.23
" Vanderburg v. Kansas City Gas Co., 126 Mo. App. 600, 105 S. W. 17(1907).
" Cumberland Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Hobart, 89 Miss. 252, 42 So. 349 (1906).
"TAla. Water Co. v. Knowles, 220 Ala. 61, 124 So. 96 (1929).
"Carnaggio Bros. v. City of Greenwood, 142 Miss. 885, 108 So. 141 (1926);
Farmer v. Nashville, 127 Tenn. 509, 156 S. W. 189 (1912) ; City of Houston
v. Lockwood Inv. Co., 144 S. W. 685 (Tex. Civ. App. 1912); Nourse v. City
of Los Angeles, 25 Cal. App. 384, 143 Pac. 801 (1914) ; Covington v. Ratter-
man, 128 Ky. 336, 108 S. W. 297 (1908) (vendor's debt). Where, however,
there is a statutory provision, it does create a lien on the land. Howe v.
Orange, 70 N. J. Eq. 648, 62 Atl. 777 (1906) (grantor's default); Gerard L.
Ins. Co. v. Philadelphia, 88 Pa. 393 (1879) (purchaser of land at sheriff's sale).
11Birmingham Waterworks Co. v. Brooks, 16 Ala. App. 209, 76 So. 515
(1917); Frothingham v. Benson, 44 N. Y. Supp. 879 (1897). The company
must serve a person so situated, upon the installation of a separate connection.
I Gaines v. Charleston Light & Water Co., 104 S. C. 136, 88 S. E. 378
(1916); Ginnings v. Meridian Waterworks Co., 100 Miss. 507, 56 So. 450
(1911).
'Phelan v. Boone Gas Co., 147 Iowa 626, 125 N. W. 208 (1910). Requir-
ing a deposit or guarantee of a bad financial risk is a reasonable regulation.
Contra: Barriger v. Louisville Gas & Electric Co., 196 Ky. 268, 244 S. W.
690 (1922).
' Southwestern Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Danaher, 238 U. S. 482, 35 Sup. Ct.
886, 59 L. ed. 1419 (1915) ; Allen v. Cape Fear & Yadkin Valley Ry. Co., 100
N. C. 397, 6 S. E. 105 (1887). Although it implies a charge of impaired
credit, a common carrier has the right to demand the prepayment of charges
from one, even where it extends credit to others.
I O'Neal v. Citizen's Pub. Service Co., supra note 5.
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In North Carolina, while previously no situation has arisen com-
parable to the principal case, the court has strongly inclined towards
upholding and enforcing the public duty of the utility to serve all
similarly situated on equal terms 24  Was the plaintiff in the prin-
cipal case "similarly situated ?" It has further been held that the com-
pany may refuse to serve those who will not comply with its reason-
able rules and regulations. 25  Was not the requirement for an addi-
tional deposit "reasonable" under the circumstances?
It would seem that the court has displayed extraordinary solic-
itude for the subscriber. The decision is partly justified by the re-
quirement of payment in advance, but how is the company to protect
itself against nonpayment of additional charges, such as long dis-
tance calls?
CECILE L. PIrTZ.
Real Property-Adverse Possession of Separate
Interests in Land.
The plaintiff occupied land by adverse possession under color of
title for the statutory period. The defendant claimed the timber
growing on the land, basing his claim on a recorded timber deed
givdn prior to the time the plaintiff took possession of the land.
Held: The adverse possession of the land did not conclude the prior
lessee of the timber upon the land.'
Under both the common law and the Georgia Code "the right of
the owner of lands extends downward and upward indefinitely."2
Yet, there may be ownership in fee of several distinct interests in
connection with a single tract of land. One person may own the
surface of the land, another the buildings, another the timber grow-
ing on the land, and still another the minerals beneath the surface.8
Therefore, one having title to the surface may have valid claims as-
"Griffin v. Goldsboro Water Co., 122 N. C. 206, 30 S. E. 319 (1898);
Clinton-Dunn Telephone Co. v. Carolina Tel. & Tel. Co., 159 N. C. 8, 74
S. E. 636 (1912); S. & S. Ry. Co. & N. C. Pub. Service Co. v. So. Pr. Co.,
180 N. C. 422, 105 S. E. 28 (1920).
' Woodley v. Carolina Tel. & Tel. Co., 163 N. C. 284, 79 S. E. 598(1913).
McNeill v. Daniel, 164 S. E. 187 (Ga. 1932).
12 BL. CoMM. 18; GA. CoDE ANN. (Michie, 1926) §3617.
'Fox v. Pearl River Lumber Co., 80 Miss. 1, 31 So. 583 (1902); Walters
v. Sheffield, 78 Fla. 505, 78 So. 539 (1918).
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serted against him for the timber growing on the surface,4 and for
minerals beneath the surface.5
Timber may be severed from the surface by deed, and an estate
in fee, a corporeal hereditament, created therein. 0 In that event,
possession of the surface by an adverse claimant is not necessarily
adverse to the owner of the timber.7 For the limitation to run
against the timber owner, there, must be such possession of the tim-
ber evidenced by acts of ownership and control as would amount to a
separate adversd claim to the timber. s
Analogous cases are* found where the title to mineral rights has
been severed from the title to the surface, and the adverse possessor
of the surface claims title to the minerals. In such cases the courts
hold that the adverse possessor must take actual possession of the
minerals by operating mines, before the limitation will run against
the mineral owner.9 A recent case in Kentucky holds that where
minerals are severed from the surface by conveyance, the surface
owner holds possession of the minerals in trust for the mineral
owner, and no limitation can run against the latter.10 But Louisiana
takes the view that deeds conveying mineral rights convey only "real
rights" in the nature of servitude, which may be lost by non-use for
ten years to the possessor of the surface who gets title to the minerals
by prescription."
'Southwestern Lumber Co. of N. J. v. Evans, 275 S. W. 1078 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1925); Prince v. Frost-Johnson Lumber Co., 250 S. W. 785 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1923).
' Claybrooke v. Barns, 180 Ark. 678, 22 S. W. (2d) 390, 67 A. L. R. 1436(1929); Kentucky Block Cannel Coal Co. v. Seawell, 249 F. 840, 1 A. L. R.
556 (C. C. A. 6th, 1918); Green v. West Texas Coal Mining and Developing
Co., 225 S. W. 548 (Tex. Civ. App. 1920).
'Florence, Phillips and Co. v. Newsome, 26 Ga. App. 501, 106 S. E. 619
(1921); Lodwick Lumber Co. v. Taylor, 100 Tex. 270, 98 S. W. 238 (1906);
Magnetic Ore Co, v. Marbury Lumber Co., 104 Ala. 465, 16 So. 632, 27
L. R. A. 434 (1894) ; Walters v. Sheffield, supra note 3.
' Southwestern Lumber Co. of N. J. v. Evans, supra note 4. Cf. Prewitt
v. Bull, 234 Ky. 18, 27 S. W. (2d) 399 (1930); and Prince v. Frost-Johnson
Lumber Co., supra note 4, where possession of land by owmers thereof was
held not adverse possession of timber belonging to others.
$ Southwestern Lumber Co. of N. J. v. Evans, supra note 4. The dissenting
judge in the principal case, while not raising the question of the severability
of the land and timber interests, felt that there had been sufficient adverse
possession both of the land and the timber to warrant a different result.
IClaybrooke v. Barns; Kentucky Block Cannel Coal Co. v. Seawell, both
supra note 5.
'" Franklin Fluorspar Co. v. Hosick, 239 Ky. 453, 39 S. W. (2d) 665 (1931).
"Louisiana Petroleum Co. v. Broussard, 172 La. 613, 135 So. 1 (1931);
La Del Oil Properties Inc. v. Magnolia Petroleum Co,, 169 La. 1137, 126 So.
684 (1930). See EA. Rv. Civ. CoDE (Merrick, 1925) arts. 3529, 3546.
NOTE'S AND COMMENTS
The result in the instant case is apparently correct, but the ration-
ale of the decision is not clear. The court gives no reason for its
decision other than to say dogmatically that "such occupancy (by the
possessor of the land) is consistent with, and not as a matter of law
adverse to, the possession of the prior lessee." It is believed that
the same result could have been reached on the basis of other deci-
sions: First, the timber case, mentioned above, 12 in which the lease
was held to create a separate interest in fee in the timber against
which adverse possession of the land alone would not be effective;
and, second, by reasoning from analogy to the mineral cases.13
W. E. ANGLIN.
Res Judicata-Judgment in Ejectment Suit as Res Judicata
Preventing Restitution of Land.
A judgment of interpleader, construing a will, gave B a right to
rents and profits accruing from a certain tract of land. While an
appeal was pending B brought an action in ejectment against A, who
was in possession of the tract, and recovered. A did not appeal.
The original judgment of interpleader was reversed on appeal, the
court construing the will in favor of A. A now brings an action in
ejectment to regain possession of the land. Held: The first judg-
ment in ejectment not having been appealed from is res judicata as
to the question of the title to the land (Cardozo, Brandeis, and Stone,
JJ., dissenting).'
The majority of the court explains its decision upon the ground
that the original suit in equity for rents and profits and the first suit
in ejectment were separate and unrelated suits. Therefore, the re-
versal of the original judgment did not give grounds for restitution
as to the lands in the ejectment suit. The minority contends that the
first action in ejectment was dependent upon the interpleader judg-
ment, and that this second suit in ejectment is in effect a suit for
restitution to which the plaintiff is entitled.
If the construction placed upon the will by the interpleader judg-
ment-that the title to the land in question was in B-is conclusive
until reversed, then the first ejectment judgment was dependent upon
the interpleader judgment. The general rule is that where a judg-
' Southwestern Lumber Co. of N. 1. v. Evans, supra note 4.
"' Claybrooke v. Barns; Kentucky Block Cannel Coal Co. v. Seawell, both
supra note 5.
SReed v. Allen, 286 U. S. 191, 52 Sup. Ct. 532, 76 L. ed. 749 (1932). This
case has been commented upon in (1932) 88 U. oF PA. L. REv. 77.
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ment determines the title under which a party claims, it is res judicata
as to any other property or right claimed under the same title in a
subsequent action between the same parties. 2 Applying the rule to
the instant case it seems clear that the trial court in the first action
in ejectment was bound by the previous construction of the will. In
fact, the only defense pleaded by A in the first ejectment action was
in the nature of a plea in abatement on the grounds that the question
of title was pending on appeal. Therefore, a reversal of the inter-
pleader judgment ought to give grounds for restoring the parties to
their original position.
The doctrine of restitution operates to restore to a litigant that
which is lost by reason of the subsequent reversal of a judg-
ment.3  But apparently the courts have limited this rule to prop-
2"But where a judgment determines the title or right under which a party
claims, it is decisive as to any other property or right claimed under that
same title." 34 C. J. 906. Brock v. Boyd, 211 Ill. 290, 71 N. E. 995, 103
Am. St. Rep. 200 (1904) (a decree in adoption proceedings on which title
depends is res judicata as to another suit for partition of land) ; Mass. v.
Brant, 216 Mo. 641, 116 S. W. 503 (1909) (judgment declaring void a judg-
ment under which land was sold is res judicata as to purchaser of land);
Angelo v. Aldridge, 164 Ill. 388, 45 N. E. 722 (1896) (a decree for rents and
profits is res judicata as to subsequent suit for partition) ; Sou. Pac. Ry. v.
United States, 168 U. S. 1, 18 Sup. Ct. 18, 42 L. ed. 355 (1897) ; Johnson v.
Victoria Chief Copper M. & S. Co., 150 App. Div. 653, 135 N. Y. Supp. 1070(1912) ; Re Lart, [1896] 2 Ch. 788, 65 L. J. Ch. N. S. 846, 72 L. T. N. S. 175;
Carson v. McCormick Harvesting Machine Co., 18 Tex. Civ. App. 225, 44 S. W.
406 (1898).
Contra: Malona v. Schwing, 101 Ky. 56, 39 S. W. 523 (1897).
"Where a judgment or decree of an inferior court is reversed by a finaljudgment in a court of review, a party is in general entitled to restitution
of all things lost by reason of the judgment in the lower court." 18 Enc. P1.
& Pr. 871.
This doctrine of restitution originated in the common law as a part of the
inherent power of the courts. Ranson v. City of Pierre, 101 Fed. 665 (C. C.
A. 8th, 1900); Skinner v. Hannon, 30 N. Y. Supp. 987 (1884). However,
today it is controlled by statutes in a great many states. N. C. CoDE ANN.
(Michie, 1931) §1534; ALA. CODE (Michie, 1928) §§8023, 8030; VA. CODE
ANN. (Michie, 1931) §6412.
In spite of the general application of the doctrine to "all things lost by reason
of a judgment" it has been held not to apply where the judgment was volun-
tarily paid. Teasdale v. Stroller, 133 Mo. 645, 34 S. W. 873 (1896) ; Travelers
Ins. Co. v. Heath, 95 Pa. St. 333 (1880). Contra: Schooley v. Hashley, 72
N. Y. 578 (1878) ; Hiller v. Hiller, 35 Ohio St. 645 (1880). Neither does it
apply where the specific property cannot be returned. Farmer v. Rogers, 10
Cal. 335 (1858). Nor after the property is in the hands of an innocent pur-
chaser for value. Vogler v. Montgomery, 54 Mo. 577 (1874); Dodson v.
Butler, 101 Ark. 416, 142 S. W. 503, 39 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1100, Ann. Cas.
1913E 1001 (1912). Nor against one who did not enter on land under the one
whose title was declared void by the reversal. Mayo v. Sprout, 45 Cal. 99
(1872).
But restitution can be had for crops grown on land between trial judgment and
reversal by Supreme Court. Stanborough v. Cook, 86 Iowa 741, 53 N. W.
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erty taken directly under the judgment which is reversed. 4 How-
ever, this limitation was placed upon the doctrine when the tech-
nical rules of procedure were emphasized more than they are now.5
Then, too, those cases in which restitution was refused, because the
property was not taken directly under the judgment that was re-
versed, did not involve the doctrine of res judicata between the two
judgments. In the instant case there is a loss of property by virtue
of a judgment (interpleader) which has been subsequently reversed.
It would be consistent to extend the doctrine to this case.
The majority of the court recognizes the equities in favor of A
by admitting that if the first judgment in ejectment had been ap-
pealed from, it probably would have been reversed; or *the appeal
would have been consolidated with the appeal in the interpleader
suit.6 They insist, however, that an appeal in the first ejectment
action is the only remedy available to A. 7 But this is putting rules
of procedure above the justice of the cause. The second judgment
in ejectment, as Cardozo, J. suggests, should be treated as a suit for
restitution.8  WILLIAM MEDFORD.
131 (1892). It also applies when more land is taken in ejectment than is
called for by the judgment. Russel v. Webb, 96 Ark. 190, 131 S. W. 456
(1910). Or when land other than that included in a judgment is taken. Ex
parte Reynolds, 1 Cai. 500 (N. Y. 1804); Shaw v. Bayard, 4 Pa. 257 (1846).
"Durham & N. W. Ry. Co. v. N. C. Ry. Co., 108 N. C. 304, 12 S. E.
983 (1890); Eilers v. Wood, 64 Wis. 422, 25 N. W. 440 (1885); Murry v.
Berdell, 98 N. Y. 480 (1885); Reynolds v. Reynolds, 67 Cal. 20, 8 Pac.
184 (1885).
'Dicta in more recent cases indicate a possible change of attitude. Elis v.
McGovern, 153 App. Div. 26, 137 N. Y. Supp. 1029 (1912) ; Walz v. Agricul-
tural Ins. Co., 282 Fed. 646 (E. D. Mich. 1922); Ure v. Ure, 223 Ill. 454, 79
N. E. 153, 114 Am. St. Rep. 336 (1906).
1 It is clear that it would have been reversed. Butler v. Eaton, 141 U. S.
240, 11 Sup. Ct. 985, 35 L. ed. 713 (1891); Arkadelphia Milling Co. v. St.
Louis S. & W. Ry., 249 U. S. 134, 39 Sup. Ct. 237, 63 L. ed. 517 (1919) ; Poole
v. Seney, 70 Iowa 275, 30 N. W. 634 (1868) ; Ranson v. City of Pierre, supra
note 3; Hennessy v. Tacoma Smelting & Ref. Co., 129 Fed. 40 (C. C. A. 9th,
1904).
7 The court cites Butler v. Eaton, supra note 6, as dearly pointing out that
this was the only remedy available in this situation. But the case does not
point this out. It merely decides that when a previous judgment, upon which
the case before it depended, has been reversed, it can reverse the judgment
itself instead of sending it back to the court below.
'The proper way to obtain a writ of restitution at common law was by a
motion. Sometimes, however, the appellate court would, when it reversed the
judgment, direct the return of all property taken under authority of the
judgment. There is some authority for. allowing an action for money had.
and received in this situation. Haebler v. Meyers, 132 N. Y. 363, 30 N. E.
963, 15 A. L. R. 588, 28 Am. St. Rep. 589 (1892) is an illustration of such
an action being allowed It would not be radically out of line either with the
modem attitude toward procedure or with the idea of restitution to allow this
second action in ejectment to be treated as a suit for restitution.
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Taxation-Copyright Royalties as Immune From State
Taxation.
In Maxwell v. Chemical Construction Co.,1 decided in March
1931, the North Carolina Supreme Court held unconstitutional a tax
on income derived from royalties on patents issued by the United
States. Identically the same form of tax had been declared invalid
by the United States Supreme Court three years earlier in Long v.
Rockwood,2 and the North Carolina court considered that decisiori
controlling. On May 16, 1932, the United States Supreme Court
decided Fox Film Corporation v. Doyal,3 upholding a Georgia priv-
ilege tax measured by gross receipts, which in the contested case
were royalties from copyrights. Their decision in Long v. Rock-
wood having been urged upon the court, Mr. Chief Justice Hughes
agreed that in this question copyrights and patents stood in the same
position and remarked that, "the affirmance of the judgment in the
instant case cannot be reconciled with the decision in Long v. Rock-
wood-and in view of the conclusions now reached upon a re-
examination of the question, that case is definitely overruled."'4
Thus comes to an early end a generally criticized 5 extension of the
doctrine, long established, that state and federal governmental in-
strumentalities-are free from taxation by the other government. Mr.
Justice Holmes' dissent in Long v. Rockwood contained the theory
1200 N. C. 500, 157 S. E. 606 (1931). (1931) 9 N. C. L. REv. 475. The
income of the company for 1929 was assessed at $134,341.96, and upon this
sum, receiyed from royalties, was levied a tax amounting to $6,907.76. The
tax was paid under protest and appeal taken from the ruling of'the Commis-
sioner of Revenue.
2277 U. S. 148, 48 Sup. Ct. 463, 72 L. ed. 824 (1928).
'52 Sup. Ct. 546 (1932). (1932) 41 YALa L. J. 1237. The Fox case is
followed in Com. v. Hannaford, 165 S. E. 512 (Va. 1932).
'52 Sup. Ct. 546, 548 (1932). The court might have distinguished this tax
from Long v. Rockwood in the manner of the North Carolina court's dis-
tinction between the Chemical Construction case and Educational Films Corp.
v. Ward, 282 U. S. 379, 51 Sup. Ct. 170, 75 L. ed. 400 (1931), i.e., the dis-
tinction between an income tax and a privilege tax measured by income. How-
ever, the distinction between franchise and income taxation might be offset in
statute-healing properties by the difference between gross receipts and income
as measures of the tax.
'(1928) 77 U. OF PA. L. REv. 115; (1928) 28 CoL. L. REV. 1100; (1929) 13
M Qui-= L. REv. 117; (1931) 9 N. C. L. REV. 475. In the latter note the
opinion was expressed that inasmuch as Long v. Rockwood was a five to four
decision, the changed personnel of the judiciary might result in a court which
disapproved the authority the North Carolina court felt compelled to follow.
Strangely enough, there was no dissent in the Fox Film case. Van Devanter,
vtcReynolds, and Butler, JJ., who with Mr. Chief Justice Taft and Mr. Justice
Sanford formed the Long v. Rockwood majority, acquiesced in the overturn-
ing of that case.
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of decision in the Fox Film case, that a nondiscriminatory tax on the
-income from copyrights is not a tax upon any governmental function.
More important is the ascendency, though in a restricted measure,
-of the philosophy that powers and immunities, once thought to be
absolute, must be considered with regard to their effect.
Of incidental interest here, is the provision in the North Carolina
Revenue 'Act which imposes a flat rate license tax on persons en-
gaged in the business of selling patent rights.6 Assuming this to
mean patent rights granted by the United States, what is the con-
stitutional status of the tax?7 Both this tax and that involved in
the Fox Film case are privilege taxes, but with the difference that
the flat rate may be more burdensome than a gross receipts levy.
Under the absolute immunity theory of Long v. Rockwood this tax
should have been invalid. Though flat rate taxation often is in-
iquitous, this license, since small in amount, would likely be counte-
m-anced under the Court's present view.
E. M. PERKINS.
Trusts--Distinction Between Dividend and Coupon Funds.
The increasing burden imposed on the courts of adjudicating the
-various conflicting claims of creditors of insolvent corporations pro-
vokes serious inquiry as to the universally recognized distinction be-
tween a fund created to meet bond interest and a similar fund
created to meet declared dividends.1 The repeated efforts of the
I N. C. CoDE ANN. (Michie, 1931) §7880 (94). "Every person, firm or cor-
poration engaged in the business of selling or offering for sale any patent right
or formula shall apply in advance and obtain from the Commissioner of Rev-
enue a separate State license for each and every county in this State where
such patent right or formula is to be sold or offered for sale, and shall pay
for each separate license a tax of ten dollars ($10.00). Counties, cities, or
-towns may levy a license tax on the business taxed under this section not in
,excess of the taxes levied by the State."
I A similar tax has been found in every Revenue Act since 1913, but so far
as can be determined it has not been judicially construed in North Carolina.
See, holding like statutes unconstitutional, Commonwealth v. Petty, 96 Ky.
452, 29 S. W. 291 (1895) ; In re Sheffield, 64 Fed. 833 (C. C. Ky. 1894).
'In Re Interborough Consolidated Corporation, 288 Fed. 334 (C. C. A. 2d,
1923) the court said: "There seems to be a fundamental distinction between a
fund set apart for the payment of a dividend and a fund set apart for the
:payment of ordinary indebtedness". In Guidise v. Island Refining Corpora-
tion, 291 Fed. 922 (S. D. N. Y. 1923) Judge Learned Hand declared, "I
.annot conceive any legal distinction between a fund deposited in a bank to
meet a declared dividend and called a 'Dividend Account,' and a similar fund
-deposited to meet coupons and called a 'Coupon Account'. A declared dividend
is universally regarded as a debt, and a coupon is of course no more than a
secured debt. How it can be thought, ceteris paribus, that one account should
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coupon holders to impress a trust character on the former have been
of no avail ;2 whereas similar efforts on the part of the stockholders
as to the latter have invariably been successful.3 It is well to state
at the outset that deposits for a specific purpose are not within the
scope of the present inquiry, 4 for, obviously, the court will declare
even a coupon fund a trust when the circumstances surrounding the
creation of the fund clearly indicate an intention to create a trust.5
The matter which arouses interest is the fact that the courts hold
that a dividend fund is a trust regardless of the circumstances at-
tending its creation.6 As was said in the first of the Interborough
be a trust fund and the other not passes the limit of my discrimination". But
authority bound Judge Hand to hold to the contrary. In an article on Status
of Funds Deposited for the Payment of Interest on Bonds, (1925) 19 ILL. L.
REv. 429, Robert L. Grinell says that "why the creation of a debt plus the
setting apart of the money to pay it should create a trust, while the setting
apart of money to pay a debt already in existence does not, is nowhere made
clear", and adds that both lines of cases are "of too long standing to be
easily upset".
'Williamsport Gas Co. v. Pinkerton, 95 Pa. St. 62 (1880); Adams v.
Hackensack Commission, 44 N. J. L. 638, 43 Am. Rep. 406 (1882); Van
Horn v. Kittitas County, 28 Misc. Rep. 333, 59 N. Y. Supp. 883 (1889);
Staten Island Club v. Trust Co., 41 App. Div. 321, 58 N. Y. Supp. 460 (1899) ;
Noyes v. First National Bank, 180 App. Div. 162, 167 N. Y. Supp. 288 (1917) ;
Guidise v. Island Refining Corp. supra note 1; Re Interborough Consolidated
Corporation, supra note 1; Erb v. Banco di Napoli, 243 N. Y. 45, 152 N. E.
460 (1926); Pike v. Anglo South American Trust Co., 267 Mass. 130, 166
N. E. 553 (1929).
' Le Roy v. Globe Insurance Co., 2 Edw. Ch. 657 (N. Y. 1836); Re Le
Blanc, 14 Hun 8 (N. Y. 1878); Re Interborough Consolidated Corporation,
267 Fed. 914 (S. D. N. Y. 1920); see Jermain v. Lake Shore Ry. Co., 91
N. Y. 483, 492 (1883); Albany Fertilizer Co. v. Arnold, 103 Ga. 145, 148,
29 S. E. 695, 696 (1897); Re Sutherland, 23 F. (2d) 595, 599 (C. C. A.
2d, 1928); Van Dyck v. McQuade, 86 N. Y. 38, 52 (1881).
'For a discussion of deposits for a specific purpose, see (1931) 10 N. C. L.
REv. 381.
'In Rogers Locomotive Works v. Kelly, 88 N. Y. 234 (1882), the cor-
poration deposited money to meet interest coupons under the following written
agreement: "Received of corporation $25,000 in trust, to apply the same to
an equal amount of corporation's coupons in order of presentment, said money
not to be subject to the control of corporation otherwise than for payment of
the said coupons." In Steel Cities Chemical Co. v. Virginia Carolina Chemical
Co., 7 F. (2d) 280 (C. C. A. 2d, 1925), the company, under a trust indenture,
transferred to a trust company, as trustee, all its property, to pay as per trust
agreement the interest coupons as they fell due. Judge Hand dissented with
"whatever may be said for the original ground of the doctrine and for any
theoretical distinction between dividends and coupons, it seems to be unfor-
tunate to introduce nice distincti6ns into such a subject, where certainty and
simplicity is the first requirement." In Holland Trust Co. v. Sutherland, 177
N. Y. 327, 69 N. E. 647 (1904), a foreign corporation to secure its bonds
assigned all its property to plaintiff as trustee and by the same trust instru-
ment agreed to set apart certain revenues "to be used exclusively to pay the
interest on bonds and for no other purposes." (Italics ours).
62 CooK, CoapoRAioNs (8th ed. 1923) §541; 7 THomrsoX, CoRpoRIoNs
(3d ed. 1927) §5308; cases cited, supra note 3.
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cases, 7 "the fact that the dividends were declared and set aside dis-
tinguishes it in principle from that class of cases where the trust
fund question depends on the circumstances and sometimes on the
language used when the fund was .created or deposited." It is be-
lieved that the failure to see this distinction has been the source of
all the misunderstanding. 8
Apparently the first case of any importance declaring that a div-
idend fund was a trust for the benefit of the stockholders was Le
Roy v. Globe Insurance Company,9 decided in 1836. There the cor-
poration declared a dividend, debited the amount on the corporation
books, and made out all the dividend checks. The corporation was
declared insolvent before the plaintiff had received his share of the
dividends. The court held that a trust fund had been created in
favor of the stockholders and that the plaintiff could recover in
preference to the general creditors of the corporation. There may
be some doubt as to whether there was a sufficient segregation of the
funds to establish a trust res, since the checks were drawn on the
corporation's general account at the bank,10 but the doctrine of the
case has since been consistently followed and approved."
Neither the language of the Le Roy case nor that of subsequent
cases has been very helpful. But it is clear that in the coupon cases
the courts will not declare a trust unless two elements are present:
(1) a trust regs,12 in the nature of a fund, and (2) an unequivocal
7267 Fed. 914 (S. D. N. Y. 1920) Although declaring the fund a trust as
to the amount necessary to pay the dividends, the court reserved the point as
to the status of money remaining after the dividend claims had been satisfied.
'In Guidise v. Island Refining Corp., supra note 1, Judge Hand says, "what
seems to me of consequence is that each remittance was sent on with the
understanding that the obligor should not have anything more to do with it,
and that the bank should distribute it to those who were entitled. That, I
should think, might have been treated as an irrevocable release of control,
and so, a valid declaration of trust". In Re Interborough Consolidated Cor-
pofation, supra note 2, the court said "we find it impossible to spell out a trust
in favor of the coupon holder, although we admit that we entered upon
consideration of this case inclined to think that a trust relationship existed".
'2 Edw. Ch. 657 (N. Y. 1836).
"In the course of the opinion the court said, "it makes no difference in myjudgment that the money was not told out and specifically set apart in the
bank to meet these checks, or that a separate fund was not created for the
purpose, or that the money intended to meet them still formed a part of the
general mass standing to the credit of the company on the books of the bank".
This language clearly explodes any attempted analogy between coupon funds
and dividend funds on the ground of the particular terms of the contract
with the bank when the deposit is made.
"' Cases cited, supra note 3.
" The trust res is never a prominent question in the coupon cases, for the
6uits always involve an attempt to impress a trust on a specific and designated
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expression of intent to create a trust.' 3 On the other hand, in the
dividend cases the court's inquiry is restricted to the trust res, and if
a sufficient segregation from the general assets of the corporation is
shown, that, ipso facto, gives rise to a trust regardless of what the
intent of the corporation may have been.' 4 Furthermore, when the
fund is not deposited in the bank, the corporation is declared the
trustee.15 The inevitable conclusion is that the distinction is pred-
icated upon a relation between the corporation and its stockholders
which does not exist between the ordinary debtor and creditor.' 6
It has long been established that the proper and authorized dec-
laration of a dividend creates an irrevocable debt due from the cor-
poration to the stockholder, placing the latter in the position of a
general creditor.' 7 But the important thing to notice is the fact that
bank deposit. It becomes important in the dividend cases due to the fact
that quite often the dividend is payible out of a general account at the bank
or is payable at the office of the corporation.
'In Re Interborough Consolidated Corporation, supra note 2, the court
held that "nothing that was said or done amounted to a declaration of trust,
and the relation between the bank and the depositor continued to be that of
debtor and creditor", and that "the bank here was simply the agent of the
bankrupt, agreeing merely to pay the latter's checks when presented. This
agreement created a mere agency, and like all other agencies not coupled with
an interest, was revocable at will and conferred no title or equitable lien on
any third party or coupon holder". Attempts to apply the Lawrence v. Fox
doctrine have generally failed for lack of an express promise, supported by
Consideration, by the bank to pay the coupon holders. Staten Island Club v.
Trust Co.; Erb v. Banco di Napoli, both supra note 2.
" Le Roy v. Globe Insurance Co.; Van Dyck v. McQuade; Jermain v. Ry.
Co.; Re Sutherland, all supra note 3. However, when a dividend is declared
and a fund deposited in the bank, the insolvency of the bank does not cut
off the stockholder's right against the corporation until a reasonable notice
of the deposit has been given. King v. Paterson & Hudson R. Co., 29 N. J.
L. 82 (1860). This is clearly true in the case of coupon funds. Williamsport
Gas Co. v. Pinkerton, supra note 2.
"'Van Dyck v. McQuade; Jermain v. Ry. Co., both supra note 3.
" Note (1928) 28 CoL. "L. RFv. 477.
" The cases agree that a cash dividend which has been declared is not
revocable. Beers v. Bridgeport, Spring Co., 42 Conn. 17 (1875) ; McLaren v.
Crescent Co., infra. One court allowed the directors of a corporation to
"rescind the vote" to pay a dividend where it had been given absolutely no
publicity or, publication. Ford v. East Hampton Rubber Thread Co., 158
Mass. 84, 32 N. E. 1036 (1893). But even this decision was criticized in the
McLaren case, infra. The stockholder whose dividend is declared does not
stand as a preferred creditor until there has been a segregation of the funds
so as to give rise to a trust. Lowne v. American Fire Insurance Co., 6 Paige
482 (N. Y. 1837); Hunt v. O'Shea, 69 N. H. 600, 45 Atl. 480 (1899); Mc-
Lare n v. Crescent Co., 117 Mo. App. 40, 93 S. W. 819 (1906); Staats v.
Biograph Co., 236 Fed. 454 (C. C. A. 2d, 1916) ; see Elkins v. First National
Bank, 43 F. (2d) 777, 779 (C. C. A. 4th, 1930). But the language in some
of the cases is to the effect that mere declaration divides the property which
belongs to the corporation into that which the corporation retains and that
which the corporation agrees to pay to the stockholders, or that mere declara-
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the debt is not supported by the usual common law consideration, but
by the peculiar relationship which the corporation bears to the stock-
holder.' 8 It has been said that this relationship is, to all practical
purposes, that of trustee and cestui.19 Although this may not be
technically true, the fact cannot be escaped that the stockholders are,
in a sense, the beneficial owners of the corporate property. That
proposition has been adequately recognized by those cases in which
the court has deemed it desirable to disregard the separate legal en-
tity of the corporation. 20 It would logically follow that the earned
increment from which a dividend is declared is also, in a sense,
beneficially owned by the stockholders.2 1 The formality of declar-
ing a dividend is, in effect, no more than a dissolution of a portion
of the corporate property in favor of the stockholders. And once
that portion is segregated from the mass, it is not a matter of great
difficulty to realize it as a trust fund in their favor.22
In this way there can be found at least a technical distinction be-
tion is, in legal contemplation, a separation of the amount from the assets of
the corporation, which holds such amount thereafter as trustee of the stock-
holder. Staats v. Biograph Co., suprg; Hopper v. Sage, 112 N. Y., 530, 20
N. E. 350, 8 Am. Rep. 771 (1889). But ordinarily, mere declaration does
not entitle the stockholder to sue in equity. Searles v. Gebbie, 115 App. Div.
778, 101 N. Y. Supp. 199 (1906). But see Beers v. Bridgeport, supra at 24.
The person owning the stock when the dividend is declared is the one entitled
to it and not the one owning the stock wfien the dividend is paid. Hopper
v. Sage, supra; Hill v. Newwanawich, 8 Hun 459 (N. Y. 1876).
' As was said in Ford v. East Hampton Rubber Thread Co., supra note 17,
"the doctrine as applicable to simple contracts between persons having no
fiduciary relation to each other is not applicable to the promise of a cor-
poration to pay a dividend. The corporation's purpose is to make money for
its stockholders, and it is the duty of the directors from time to time to
declare dividends out of the net earnings, if there are any. The whole property
of the corporation is held on a sort of trust for the stockholders, and the
directors are, in a sense, managers. The stockholder's cause of action does
not arise from any actual contract between the corporation and the stock-
holder, but from the nature of the organization and the relation of the stock-
-holders to the corporation and its property. The amount after declaration is
considered as property held by the corporation for the use of the stockholders
individually".
"See Moore v. Schoppert, 22 W. Va. 282, 290 (1883).
" First Nat. Bank v. Trebein, 59 Ohio St. 316, 52 N. E. 834 (1898) ; Rice
v. Sanger Bros., 27 Ariz. 15, 229 Pac. 397 (1924).
"See Re Sutherland, supra note 3, to the effect that a stockholder has a
vested interest in the corporate profits.
I In Re Le Blanc, .upra note 3, and Re Interborough Consolidated Cor-
poration the language is that the stockholders acquired a "lien in equity" on
the fund. But in conformance with the trust idea it has been held that the
corporation cannot be taxed on such fund. Pollard v. First National Bank
47 Kan. 406, 28 Pac. 202 (1891). It would therefore seem to follow that
the fund could not be garnished by a creditor of the rorporation, or be sub-
jected to tort or wage claims against the corporation.
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tween the two funds. But the question remains whether the con-
clusion reached by the courts is justified. As a practical matter the
present-day stockholder is far removed from either ownership or
control of the corporate property. To hold that a dividend fund is
a trust necessitates indulgence in a process of abstract theorizing
which should never be resorted to in the absence of cogent reasons
of public policy. And if public policy is at all involved, it would
seem to favor the creditor of the corporation rather than the stock-
holder. FRANK P. SPRUILL, JR.
Workmen's Compensation-Conflict of Laws--Injury to
Employee Outside State of Employment.
The deceased, a resident of Vermont, was employed in that state
by a Vermont corporation, and was killed while doing temporary
work in New Hampshire. Thd administratrix of deceased, a resi-
dent of New Hampshire, brought suit in that state for the death of
her intestate. The Vermont Compensation Act provides that the
employee's acceptance of the Act bars a recovery in Ia suit at law;
whereas the New Hampshire Act permits the employeeto elect, sub-
sequent to the injury, either to take compensation under the Act or
to sue at law. The Vermont Act also provides that workmen em-
ployed within the state shall be entitled to compensation though in-
jured outside the state. The case was removed to the federal court
on the ground of diversity of citizenship; and defendant interposed
as a defense that the Vermont Act would not permit the action. The
Supreme Court of the United States held the Vermont Act a bar to
the action brought in New Hampshire.'
Where the injury occurs outside the state of employment the con-
fusion among the courts as to what law governs is occasioned by the
conflicting tort and contract theories of workmen's compensation and
the differences among the statutes themselves. 2 The earlier tendency
Bradford Electric Light Co. v. Clapper - U. S. - , 52 Sup. Ct. 571,
76 L. ed. 757 (1932).
2 See an excellent article by Dwan, Workmen's Compensation and the Con-
flict of Laws (1927) 11 MiNN. L. Rv. 329.
In connection with the general problem, see GOODRICH, CNFLICT OF LAWS(1927) §§202-206; CoNFCT OF LAWS RESTATEMENT (Am. L. Inst. 1926)§§434-443; Angell, Recovery Under Workmen's Compensation Act for Injury
Abroad (1918) 31 HAmv. L. Rzv. 619; (1918) 27 YALx L. J. 113; (1927) 5
TEx. L. Rzv. 416; (1931) 79 U. OF PA. L. REv. 86; (1930) 16 VA. L. REv.
701; (1925) 10 CoRN. L. Q. 364. On extraterritorial operation of workmen's
compensation acts, see Note (1919) 3 A. L. R. 1351; Note (1929) 59 A. L. R.
735.
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was to hold the act strictly territorial, and allow compensation only
for injuries occurring within the state.3 But the modern trend is to
allow a recovery under the act of the state of employment for in-
juries received elsewhere. 4 Where the injury occurs outside the
state but arises from employment merely incidental to the main em-
ployment within the state, most courts give their acts extraterritorial
effect and allow compensation.5 But where the parties are in one
state and the contract contemplates permanent employment in an-
other state, it has been held that the act of the state of injury applies.8
The majority of cases, however, allow compensation in the state of
hiring although the duties of the employee are to be performed out-
side that state.7 Conversely, where recovery was sought under the
'Gould's Cas, 215 Mass. 480, 102 N. E. 693 (1913) (changed by MAss.
STAT. (1927) c. 309, §93); North Alaska Salmon Co. v. Pillsbury, 174 Cal. 1,
162 Pac. 93 (1916) (changed by CAL. GEx. LAWs (Deering, 1931) act 4749,
§58).
In some states the application of the act is limited to injuries received in
the state. PA. STAT. (West, 1920) §21916.
' Rounsaville v. Cent. R. Co., 87 N. J. L. 371, 94 At. 392 (1915) ; Smith
v. Van Noy Interstate Co., 150 Tenn. 25, 262 S. W. 1048 (1924) ; Metropol-
itan Casualty Ins. Co. of N. Y. v. Hahn, 165 Ga. 667, 142 S. E. 121 (1928) ;
Miller Bros. Const. Co. v. Maryland Casualty Co., 155 Atl. 709 (Conn. 1931).
In some states it is expressly provided that recovery may be had under
the act when injury occurs outside the state. But even where it is not so pro-
vided, such construction has been read into the contract of employment and
compensation allowed according to the law of the place wheie the contract
was made. Crane v. Leonard, Crossette & Riley, 214 Mich. 218, 183 N. W.
204 (1921). See Note (1925) 34 YALE L. J. 453.
Jurisdiction of a state to enact such a statute upheld: Quong Ham Wah Co.
v. Industrial Commission, 184 Cal. 26, 192 Pac. 1021 (1920); writ of error
dismissed, 255 U. S. 445, 41 Sup. Ct. 373, 65 L. ed. 723 (1921). See Note
(1921) 9 CALIF. L. REv. 230.
' Industrial Commission v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 64 Col. 480, 174 Pac. 589
(1918) ; State ex rel. Maryland Casualty Co. v. District Court, 140 Minn. 427,
168 N. W. 177 (1918); Texas Employer's Ins. Ass'n. v. Volek, 44 S. W. (2d)
795 (Tex. Civ. App. 1931) ; Norwich Union Indemnity Co. v. Wilson, 43 S. W.
(2d) 473 (Tex. Civ. App. 1931).
'Durrett v. Eicher-Woodland Lumber Co., 140 So. 867 (La, 1932) (recov-
ery of employee hired in Louisiana to do work in Mississippi held to depend
upon the law of the state of injury regardless of where the contract of hiring
was made); Ginsburg v. Byers, 171 Minn. 366, 214 N. W. 55 (1927) ; N. C.
CODE AwN. (Michie, 1931) §8081 (rr).
In Interstate Power Co. v. Industrial Commission, 203 Wis. 554, -234 N. W.
889 (1931), the defendant, a Wisconsin corporation, made the contract in
Iowa with the deceased, a resident of that state, to work in Iowa, and he was
killed while working temporarily in Wisconsin. It was held the Wisconsin
Act applied to all injuries within the state without regard to the place where
the employment contract was made. See Note (1931) 6 Wis. L. REV. 243.
Hulswit v. Escanaba Mfg. Co., 218 Mich. 500, 188 N. W. 411 (1922);
McGuire v. Phelan-Shirley Co., 111 Neb. 609, 197 N. W. 615 (1924); Beal
Bros. Supply Co. v. Industrial Comm., 341 Ill. 193, 173 N. E. 64 (1930);
Skelly Oil Co. v. Gaugenbaugh, 119 Neb. 698, 230 N. W. 688 (1930); Pettiti
v. T. J. Pardy Construction Co., 103 Conn. 101, 130 Atl. 70 (1925), noted in
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act of the state of injury it was denied because the contract of em-
ployment was made in another state.8 But a number of jurisdictions
allow compensation in the state of injury regardless of where the
contract of employment was made.9
A workmen's compensation act creates a statutory relationship,
between employer and employee. Although this relationship is not
purely contractual, it arises out of the contract of hire; and it is
therefore submitted that the act of the state of employment, rather
than that of the state of injury, should govern the rights of the
parties. 10 It may be hoped that the principal case, a decision of the
United States Supreme Court, will aid in securing more uniform de-
cisions, and lessen the existing confusion in workmen's compensation
cases where the injury occurs outside the state of employment."
The instant case is entirely in harmony with a practically uniform
line of decisions holding that any other form of relief will be denied
if the plaintiff has a remedy under the compensation act of another
jurisdiction.' 2 But apparently the North Carolina cases decided prior
to the enactment of the Workmen's Compensation Act in this state are
to the contrary.13 In Johnson v. Carolina C. & 0. Ry. Co.,14 the
(1925) 35 YALE L. J. 118. Contra: Tripp v. Industrial Commission, 89 Col.
512, 4 Pac. (2d) 917 (1931) (Coldrado Act held inapplicable where salesman
hired in Colorado by foreign corporation was killed while performing services
outside the state).8 Hopkins v. Matchless Metal Polish Co., 99 Conn. 457, 121 AtI. 828 (1923).
Contra: Ginsburg v. Byers, supra note 6.
'American Radiator Co. v. Rogge, 86 N. J. L. 463, 92 Atl. 85 (1914);
Ginsburg v. Byers, supra note 6; Ocean Accident & Guarantee Corp. v. In-
dustrial Comm., 32 Ariz. 275, 257 Pac. 644 (1927) (Arizona Act held to con-
trol rights of employee injured there though hired in California), noted in
(1928) 1 So. CALiF. REv. 274.
New York appears to be one of the few states that have adopted a definite
test for all situations. In Cameron v. Ellis Const. Co., 252 N. Y. 394, 169
N. E. 622 (1930), it was held that the place specified in the contract as that
of employment was the sole and conclusive test of what law governs. Neither
the place of the contract, site of injury, or residence of the parties is con-
trolling.
0 In Scott v. White Eagle Oil & Refining Co., 47 Fed. (2d) 615 (D. Kan.
1930), it was held that the Workmen's Compensation Act of Missouri, where
the employment contract was made, governs the parties' rights in an action
brought in Kansas by the employee injured there. Also see cases supra note 7.
u Cf. Swift v. Tyson, 16 Pet. 1, 10 L. ed. 865 (1842). See Fordham, The
Federal Courts and the Construction of Uniform State Laws (1929) 7 N. C.
L. REv. 423.
Shurtliff v. Oregon Short Line R. Co., 66 Utah 161, 241 Pac. 1058 (1925)
(recovery denied in suit at law where compensation act of the state of injury
was pleaded); Albanese v. Stewart, 78 Misc. Rep. 581, 138 N. Y. Supp. 942
(1912); Wasilewski v. Warner Sugar Refining Co., 87 Misc. Rep. 156, 149
N. Y. Supp. 1035 (1914).
2 Farr v. Babcock Lumber & Land Co., 182 N. C. 725, 109 S. E. 833
(1921) (Tennessee employee injured in North Carolina allowed recovery at
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plaintiff, a citizen of North Carolina, made a contract in Tennessee
with the railroad to perform work in that state, and the injury oc-
curred there. It was held that the plaintiff could maintain a suit at
law in North Carolina regardless of the Tennessee Act. The North
Carolina Workmen's Compensation Act15 provides that a workman
hired in the state shall be entitled to compensation for injury re-
ceived outside the state.16 Following the reasoning of the principal
case, the North Carolina Act would be a defense to a suit at law
instituted in another state by an injured employee hired in North
Carolina. Therefore, it is submitted that if the question presented
in Johnson v. Carolina C. & 0. Ry. Co. were to arise again, the
North Carolina court should reverse its position and fall in line with
the principal case.
A. T. ALLEN, JR.
law in North Carolina regardless of the Tennessee Compensation Act) ; John-
son v. Carolina C. & 0. Ry. Co., 191 N. C. 75, 131 S. E. 390 (1926), noted in
(1926) 24 MICH. L. REv. 852, (1926) 40 HARv. L. Rnv. 130, and (1926) 21
I... L. REv. 184.
1 tSupra note 13.
"N. C. CoDE ANN. (Michie, 1931) c. 133a.
N. C. CoDE ANN. (Michie, 1931) §8081 (rr). "Where an accident hap-
pens while the employee is employed elsewhere than in this State . . . the
employee or his dependents shall be entitled to compensation, if the contract
of employment was made in this State, if the employer's place of business is
in this State, and if the residence of the employee is in this State; provided
his contract of employment was not expressly for service exclusively outside
of the State; . . ."
In Kleinfeld v. Radiator Specialty Co., 3 N. C. I. C. 255 (1932), deceased,
a resident of New York, was employed by a North Carolina company, and
the accident resulting in death occurred in Michigan. It did not appear from
the record whether the contract of employment was made in North Carolina
or not, or whether it was for services exclusively outside the state. Compen-
sation was denied because deceased was not a resident or citizen of North
Carolina.
